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NOTES
DISESTABLISHING LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS A
REMEDY FOR EDUCATIONAL INADEQUACY
Aaron Saiger
Most state constitutions recognize a right to education, but courts have been
hard pressed to respond to violations of that right. Some state courts have
imposed financial and substantive reforms, only to see their implementation
miscarry as educational deficiencies stubbornly persist. Other state courts,
fearing such outcomes, instead treat education claims as nonjusticiable polit-
ical questions; in these states, public education is a right with no remedy.
This Note argues that courts should instead base remedies on state statutes
that permit states to disestablish-i.e., to withdraw authority from-defi-
cient school districts. Disestablishment, like other structural remedies, is
largely self-implementing and avoids judicial entanglement in day-to-day ad-
ministration. It is firmly rooted in statutory authority and legislativel)-de-
fined standards. Most important, disestablishment creates incentives salu-
tary to educational improvement. Intergovernmental, rather than market,
competition over control of schools offers accountability while preserving a
thoroughly public approach to educational governance.
INTRODUGTION
The failings of America's public schools are legion. American educa-
tion generally is swamped by a "rising tide of mediocrity," labeled and
lamented as such since the early days of the Reagan Administration.1 But
a minority of American schools face a more desperate crisis. A relative
handful of wretched schools, disproportionately concentrated in poor mi-
nority areas, constitute an educational and social disaster for the children
and communities that they are supposed to serve. 2
While confronting mediocrity remains the province of politicians,
educators, and reformers, problems of total educational meltdown
quickly found their way to the courts. The ensuing litigation now spans
more than three decades. However, while some dramatic victories have
been won in courtrooms, the situation in far too many classrooms re-
mains dire. This is less because it is hard to identify disastrously failing
schools than because it has been difficult for courts to craft remedies for
failures to educate. The two major categories of remedies that courts
1. National Comm'n on Excellence in Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ., A Nation at Risk-
The Imperative for Educational Reform 5 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Henig et al., The Color of School Reform: Race, Politics, and
the Challenge of Urban Education 11 (1999); see also Edward A. Zelinsky,
Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 692 (1998) (book
review) (arguing that correcting the ills of urban schools is also the best available strategy
for addressing problems ofjoblessness, crime, and racial division).
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have ordered to date-increases in state spending on underperforming
schools and requirements that such schools provide particular educa-
tional services-have yet to see much success. Moreover, many courts
have been understandably reluctant to order even these remedies, due to
concerns about judicial meddling in what is perhaps the central question
of American state and local politics: how to fund and manage public
education.3
This Note argues that courts would do well to turn to a third type of
remedy. Rather than ordering particular types of educational change,
courts should seek to improve school officials' incentives to improve edu-
cational performance. Several incentive-based proposals, notably school
choice, have gained currency in recent years. Courts are, however, un-
derstandably and correctly reluctant to invent new institutional structures
for educational governance. This Note advocates instead that judges de-
ploy existing organizational provisions in education codes to improve the
incentives of educational officials. In particular, the Note argues that in
states where legislatures have authorized the practice, courts should re-
quire states to disestablish school districts-i.e., to rescind the grant of au-
thority to school district officials-upon determination that a district is
educationally inadequate. 4
With its attention to incentives, court-ordered disestablishment of
districts avoids the problems of financial and substantive remedies while
creating substantial potential to improve education. By making the jobs
of local administrators contingent on their performance, enabling whole-
sale changes in school management, and catalyzing political circum-
stances favorable to state-level interest in educational improvement, the
remedy creates incentives that can benefit poorly performing schools. At
the same time, by relying on state legislation to determine the nature of
change, retaining the public character and basic institutional framework
of American education, and offering a politically feasible reform, district
disestablishment, unlike school choice and similar proposals, avoids im-
posing substantial doctrinal or educational costs of its own. These rea-
sons also make disestablishment more likely to appeal to courts in a wide
range of states, including those that have rejected more far-reaching
remedies.
The Note has four parts. The first Part discusses contemporary ef-
forts to secure judicial remedies for educationally deficient schools. It
argues that courts must respect the limits of their judicial competence
without abdicating their responsibility to give content to the right to edu-
cation. This can best be done, it argues, by using state education codes to
craft remedies that depend on structural incentives rather than on the
good faith of school authorities for their implementation. The second
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.").
4. This is also referred to as "disdelegation." Ronald T. Hyman, State-Operated Local
School Districts in New Jersey, 96 Educ. L. Rep. 915, 926 (1995).
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Part sets out a proposal for the remedial use of disestablishment, with
particular attention to state laws that provide the statutory background
for such a remedy. The third Part argues that school district disestablish-
ment would create incentives for school district and state officials that
would benefit children now being inadequately educated. The final Part
critiques the argument that court-ordered dissolution of deficient school
districts is undesirable because it interferes with local control over educa-
tion, especially in minority communities.
I. THE SEARCH FOR REMEDIES FOR ACADEMIC DEFICIENCY
The contemporary struggle to use the courts to improve inadequate
schools is ending its third decade. Commentators generally divide this
period into three roughly chronological "waves" of litigation, each based
on a different theory of what constitutes an individual's legal rights to
education. 5 The first "wave," litigated in federal court, ended with the
United States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in San Antonio Independent
SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez that substantial inequities in per-pupil spending
between poor and rich school districts do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 6 Attention then shifted to the state courts, where a
second "wave" of plaintiffs claimed that such interdistrict inequities vio-
lated state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. 7 The third
"wave," still ongoing, focuses on claims that the education clauses found
in many state constitutions guarantee a right to adequate education which
low-performing districts fail to meet.8
5. The "wave" metaphor originates with William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The
Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School
Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & Educ. 219, 222-32 (1990). See also Julie K.
Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 493,
498-502 (1995) (adopting the metaphor); Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave:
Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 Harv. J. on Legis.
507, 509-14 (1991) (same).
6. 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). The Rodriguez court declined to apply strict scrutiny to the
Texas system of financing schools with an ad valorem property tax, holding that "wealth
discrimination" does not evoke strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at
28-29, and that education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, see id.
at 37-39.
7. The second "wave" is generally dated from 1973 to 1989, although equal protection
arguments appear in later cases. See, e.g., Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning
Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts'
Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 Ohio St. LJ. 1867, 1871-74 (1998). The leading
second-wave case was Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976), which held, unlike
Rodfigu=, that "discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district wealth
involves a suspect classification" and that "education is a fundamental interest" under the
California Constitution, and therefore that California's property-tax-based school finance
scheme violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection. For a list of second-
wave cases, including Serrano, and summaries of their holdings, see McMillan, supra, at
1873 nn.27-28.
8. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989), is
generally regarded as dating the beginning of the third wave and as the leading third-wave
1832 [Vol. 99:1830
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The "wave" metaphor is apt. It nicely evokes the ebb and flow of
ight-to-education litigation, where theories crest amid high hopes only
to recede as their weaknesses are revealed. It also captures the general
failure of such litigation to advance educational practice in distressed
schools. Like breakers raised by a thunderstorm, which churn the surf
but whose passing leaves the essential contours of the beach unchanged,
litigation has spawned some spectacular educational change but very little
educational improvement. Lawsuits have induced many state legislatures
to adopt new financing formulas that seek to equalize per-pupil spend-
ing; as a result, many once-poor school districts, like Hartford, Connecti-
cut and Newark, NewJersey, now provide per-pupil resources at or above
their state average.9 In Kentucky, the declaration in Rose v. Council for
Better Education that the state's entire system of public education was un-
constitutional' ° led to a complete rewriting of that state's education
code." But notwithstanding all this effort, twenty-five years after
Rodriguez, the beachhead of America's educational status quo remains
largely as it ever was: Numerous schools in the vast suburban heartland,
generally adequate or better (though surely offering plenty of room for
improvement), coexist with a smaller number of schools-in inner cities,
in some first-generation suburbs, and in a few rural areas-that are cata-
strophically inadequate and devastatingly unequal. 12
This should not be surprising. Beaches are shaped not by individual
waves-even spectacular ones-but by climate, erosion, and time. This
Part argues that no single substantive theory-no wave-offers a solution
case. For a comprehensive list of third-wave cases through February 1997 and their
holdings, see The Courts and Equity:. A State-by-State Overview, in Strategies for School
Equity. Creating Productive Schools in ajust Society 70-83 (Marilyn Gittell ed., 1998).
9. See Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The
Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in Law and School Reform: Six
Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity 88, 111 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999)
[hereinafter McUsic, The Law's Role] (funding in Hartford); search of National Center for
Education Statistics Common Core of Data, School Years 1988-89 through 1993-94, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., agency file (1989-93 CD version) (search on NCES identifier 3411340),
state file (1989-93 CD version) (search on New Jersey) (per-pupil spending in Newark
went from $7,907 in fiscal year 1990 to $11,632 in fiscal year 1993, an increase of 47% in
unadjusted dollars, while average unadjusted statewide expenditures per pupil rose from
$7,546 to $8,770 during the same period).
10. 790 S.W.2d at 215.
11. See CharlesJ. Russo, School-Based Decision Making in Kentucky- Dawn of a New
Era or Nothing New Under the Sun?, 83 Ky. LJ. 123, 123-30 (1995) (describing the
impact of the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 (KERA)). See generally C. Scott
Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education,
28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 599, 613-22 (1995) (describing difficulties in KERA's
implementation).
12. See generally McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 105 ("[S]uccessful school
finance cases have failed to . . . translate success in the courtroom to success in the
classroom."). For the classic contemporary jeremiad mourning the gross inequities and
inadequacies of America's most distressed school districts, see generally Jonathan Kozol,
Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (1991).
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to the problems of educational inadequacy. 13 Even if courts could iden-
tify the particular educational practices that state constitutions require-
itself a doubtful proposition-they lack the capacity of the political
branches to apply sustained creativity, flexibility, and political will to the
implementation of those practices effectively over a long term. This does
not mean, however, that courts should abandon the effort to give content
to constitutional rights to education. Instead, judges must reconceptual-
ize the ways they shape remedies when they determine that children are
being cheated of the education to which they are entitled. Courts must
focus not on how best to fix failing schools, but on how to catalyze the
work of legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies 14 so as to induce them
to embark on sustained educational reform.
A. Educational Adequacy as a Positive Political Question
Many state courts, eschewing picturesque language of sand and surf,
instead express concern over adjudicating right-to-education claims in
terms of political questions and the separation of powers. "[I] t is no part
of the duty of the courts of the State," wrote the Illinois Supreme Court in
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, to define the content of adequate
education
by judicial construction .... That may be and doubtless is a
proper question for the determination of the legislature.... To
hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judi-
cial determination would largely deprive the members of the
general public of a voice in a matter which is close to the hearts
of all individuals in Illinois. 15
In City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
based its rejection of a challenge to Rhode Island's method for funding
public schools on a refusal to "scal[e] the walls that separate law making
from judging,"1 6 supporting its decision with extensive citations from the
United States Supreme Court's political-question and separation-of-pow-
ers jurisprudence. 17 Other state courts have held similarly that judicial
involvement in educational spending decisions encroaches impermissibly
13. For other views, see Jay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms:
Developments, Lessons, and Prospects, in Law and School Reform: Six Strategies for
Promoting Educational Equity, supra note 9, at 3 ("[L]iaw-driven school reform efforts,
while falling short of their full potential, have produced important educational
improvements."); McMillan, supra note 7, at 1896-1902 (arguing that the failures of
adequacy arguments in various state courts led to the development of a "fourth wave"
theory).
14. For a brief account of the bureaucratization of schools, see James Q. Wilson,
Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 150-53, 224-25 (1989).
15. 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190-91 (IlI. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at 1196 ("[R]eform must be undertaken in a legislative forum rather
than in the courts.").
16. 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995).
17. See id. at 57-58 (citing, inter alia, I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
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on the prerogatives of their respective states' legislative 18 and executive' 9
branches.
Other courts and commentators reject such deference. In James v.
Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., the Alabama Supreme Court insisted
that it has "the power-as well as the duty-. .. to review, and, if neces-
sary, nullify, acts of the legislature it deem [s] to be inconsistent with the
fundamental law of the land."20 The Supreme Court of Wyoming went
even farther, holding that the judicial "duty to protect individual rights
includes compelling legislative action required by the constitution."
21
Other states' high courts, while acknowledging the deference due to the
executive and legislature,22 have agreed with these courts that the consti-
tutional right to education is justiciable and remediable. 23
In addition, some commentators have argued that cases like
Committee for Educational Rights and Pawtucket err in borrowing political-
question and separation-of-powers theories from federal jurisprudence,
since these doctrines, developed in the context of limited national gov-
ernment and the federal system, are inapposite in the context of state
courts and legislatures of general jurisdiction. 24 More broadly, Professor
18. See, e.g., Fair School Finance Council of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150
(Okla. 1987) (contending that there are few, if any, state constitutional restrictions on
legislative control over education); cf. James v. Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc., 713 So. 2d
869, 904 (Ala. 1997) (Hooper, CJ., dissenting) (comparingjudicial interference in efforts
by the "legislative and executive branches ...to balance the competing educational
philosophies vying for supremacy in Alabama" to the actions of "a 'strong man' dictator
who coercively enforces one philosophy upon all the people"); Peter Enrich, Leaving
Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101, 158,
161 (1995) (arguing that popularly-elected legislatures magnify public opposition to
interdistrict financial equity).
19. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 163-64 (Ga. 1981) (finding that
the Framers of the Education Clause in the Georgia Constitution intended to leave
educational finance in the hands of the "tax authorities").
20. 713 So. 2d at 879 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
21. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo. 1995).
22. This deference can be illusory. Courts that have ordered reform of school
finance, for example, generally insist in doing so that the legislature, rather than the
courts, must create and shape the state's school finance system. These courts claim that
they are limiting their own role to declaring an existing system unconstitutional. But their
decisions can be quite directive regarding the form that school finance must take to pass
constitutional muster. See, e.g., Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141, 1145-46 (Ariz. 1997)
(stating that "[wi]hich approach to take [to school finance], of course, is up to the
legislature," but noting that any approach must rely much more heavily on statewide
taxation and less on local property taxes than the system then in place); Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Without intending to intrude upon
prerogatives of other branches of government, we anticipate that they will promptly
develop and adopt specific criteria implementing these guidelines ... " (citation
omitted)).
23. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259, 261 (N.C. 1997); Tennessee Small
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 147-48 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989) (rejecting a lower state court holding).
24. See Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference
Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of
18351999]
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Helen Hershkoff has advocated an expansive conception of state-court
judicial review, arguing that "[w] hen a state constitution creates a right to
a government-provided social service," like education or welfare, "the rel-
evantjudicial question should be whether a challenged law achieves, or is
at least likely to achieve, the constitutionally prescribed end, and not, as
federal rationality review would have it, whether the law is within the
bounds of state legislative power." 25 This "consequentialist"26 view
straightforwardly excludes the "extreme deference" to legislatures2 7
found in the political-question and separation-of-powers arguments in
cases like Committee for Educational Rights and Pawtucket.
These courts and commentators, however, do not sufficiently recog-
nize that judicial power is subject to positive as well as normative con-
straints. While the normative import of separation of powers, federalism,
and judicial activism may well differ in state and federal contexts, state
courts as much as federal must confront a positive question: Is it possible
to identify judicial remedies for educational failure that are at once effec-
tive andjudicially enforceable? The elusiveness of 'Judicially discoverable
and manageable standards"28 is the best argument for state courts' reluc-
tance to engage in the redesign of educational policies.2 9
Education Finance, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 231, 268 (1998) (accusing state courts that deploy
separation-of-powers doctrines in education cases of "strained inferences" and of
"abdicat[ion]" ofjudicial responsibility); id. at 264-76 (arguing that separation-of-powers
and political-question doctrines are inapposite); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse
of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 808-09 (1992) (describing state use of the
political-question doctrine as "implausib[ly]" restrictive); Note, Unfulfilled Promises:
School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1082-83 (1991)
[hereinafter Unfulfilled Promises] (criticizing reliance on separation-of-powers principles
to justify judicial acquiescence to state legislative inaction); cf. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 189-90 (1984) (Justice of the
Oregon Supreme Court) ("If a 'political question doctrine' exists in a state court, I have
not heard of it.").
25. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1137 (1999).
26. Id. at 1184.
27. Id. at 1137.
28. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
29. Hershkoff's argument that manageable standards are available for rights like
education is a good example of emphasizing the normative at the expense of the positive.
See Hershkoff, supra note 25, at 1180-82. While she insists that courts are capable of
formulating standards to govern these difficult areas, she shortchanges the empirical
question of whether these standards are judicially enforceable, making only brief allusion
to hortatory and "learning by monitoring" benefits associated with judicial rule. Id. at
1182. Her claim that the implementation of school finance decisions, "while arduous, has
been somewhat effective in terms of improving educational conditions," id. at 1189, is both
undersupported, see id. at 1189 n.348 (citing only Hershkoff's own manuscript and an
unpublished interview with partisan attorneys), and hedged, see id. at 1190 ("[Slocial
reform always involves a long and incremental process."). Courts should pay attention to,
not ignore, a probability that the long process they set in motion will founder during
implementation. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Hershkoff is
right to argue that "Uludicial review... must serve to ensure that the government is doing
1836 [Vol. 99:1830
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That educational reform is a positive political question is most evi-
dent from the experience of those state courts that have forged ahead
and imposed judicial remedies for educational inadequacy. The first
question that faced these courts, of course, was what was to be remedied.
During the "second wave" of educational litigation, equal protection ar-
guments based on state constitutions forced state courts to face the un-
palatable question (unpalatable because there is no good answer) of what
should be equal across districts: expenditures per pupil, the ability to
raise funds through property taxes at a given level of tax effort, actual
services provided to students, actual services at a given level of student
"need," or academic performance.30 In practice, however, no one
seemed able to imagine how courts might rectify differences in academic
performance or even measure actual student services or student "need."3 '
Second-wave lawsuits therefore quickly defaulted to the only easily mea-
surable variable, focusing almost exclusively on whether school finance
systems that equalize per-pupil spending in rich and poor districts were
constitutionally required.3 2
The costs of this default were quickly revealed: School finance re-
form is very dubious medicine. 33 The question of whether additional
spending in poor districts improves education is a topic of sustained de-
bate.34 Whatever this debate ultimately concludes, it seems virtually cer-
its job and moving policy closer to the constitutionally prescribed end." Hershkoff, supra
note 25, at 1138; see infra Part I.B.
30. See Enrich, supra note 18, at 145-55; cf. McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at
106 ("Equal funding of unequal needs is not true equality.").
31. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982);
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 366 (Pa. 1979). See generally McUsic, The Law's Role,
supra note 9, at 106-07, 146 n.106.
32. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156, 165-68 (Ga. 1981); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144 (Or. 1976); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334-35 (Wyo. 1980); see also
Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
Harv. J. on Legis. 307, 316 (1991) [hereinafter McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses]
(reporting that courts in equity cases focused on financial remedies, "[p] erhaps because of
their conceptual simplicity"); Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 24, at 1078 (assuming that
the remedy for violation of educational rights is financial equalization). In some states,
courts went beyond financial equalization to order that more be spent on students in poor
districts than on other students. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 17), 575 A.2d 359, 400-03
(NJ. 1990).
33. In the face of uncertainty, some courts have simply privileged their own intuition
about whether money matters, even as they acknowledge that they may be wrong. See
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 439 (NJ. 1997) (citing Abbott 17, which in turn
was citing Abbott fl) (maintaining an order for "increased funding," even while noting that
new funds "may fail to achieve the constitutional object, [in] that no amount of money may
be able to ... make the difference for these students [in poor districts]"); see also id. at
421-22.
34. Compare Eric A. Hanushek, Conclusions and Controversies About the
Effectiveness of School Resources, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Econ. Pol'y Rev., Mar. 1998,
at 11, 22 ("Simply providing more funding or a different distribution of funding [to
schools] is unlikely to improve student achievement . . ."), with Alan B. Krueger,
18371999]
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tain that such increases are insufficient to effect educational change of
the breadth and scope that poorly performing districts so desperately
need. Inadequate districts given substantial additional resources gener-
ally continue to founder.a5
The shortcomings of financial remedies, and the unwillingness of
many courts to provide even those, led plaintiffs and advocates to search
for other solutions.3 6 The "third wave" theory that poorly performing
schools violate states' constitutional duties to educate all children ade-
quately3 7 soon led litigants and courts to consider substantive educational
remedies.38 Courts imposing such remedies would dictate not how much
Reassessing the View that American Schools Are Broken, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Econ.
Pol'y Rev., Mar. 1998, at 29, 29 ("[A]ggregate data show a surprisingly strong, positive
relationship between educational spending and student achievement...."). See generally
Does Money Matter? The Effect of School Resources on Student Achievement and Adult
Success (Gary Burless ed., 1996).
Scholars in both camps agree that the particular school a child attends can have a
substantial and significant impact on her educational achievement. See Hanushek, supra,
at 19. This finding-that, holding characteristics of students and families constant, some
schools produce consistently higher educational achievement than others-is often
described as the "effective schools" principle. However, debate rages about what
characteristics of a school make it effective, and particularly about whether these traits can
be strengthened by school budget increases. Compare Hanushek, supra, at 23 (arguing
that increasing school spending "would be fine if policymakers could reliably identify
programs that do and do not work" but that "their judgments have not been accurate in
the past"), with Gershon M. Ratuer, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 800-01 (1985) (arguing that "scholars...
generally agree" on a list of characteristics of "successful schools").
The difficulty of assessing this complex and often technical scholarly debate is vastly
compounded by the rhetorical and even polemical uses to which courts, litigants, and
advocates have put the school finance scholarship. See Michael Heise, State Constitutional
Litigation, Educational Finance, and Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1735, 1747-49 (1995). Some arguments allow the effective schools principle to trump
the finding that marginal increases in school funding may have little impact, as if the
possibility that additional resources could be used to improve education means that
mandating additional resources will, on average, improve education. Other advocates
make equally weak arguments in reverse, as if the absence of demonstrated correlation
between existing variation in school resources and educational performance implies that
there exists no effective educational reform whose efficacy might depend on more
resources.
A full treatment of the effective schools and educational resources literature, and of
their use by courts, litigants, and advocates, is beyond the scope of this Note.
35. See James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political
Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 Va.
L. Rev. 349, 393 (1990) [hereinafter Liebman, Implementing Brown] (stating that
notwithstanding substantial spending increases in poor Connecticut school districts, "the
performance of [their] students remained depressingly low.").
36. Advocates of such solutions are generally careful to note that substantive remedies
often need to be accompanied by resource increases. See, e.g., McUsic, The Law's Role,
supra note 9, at 135.
37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38. Third-wave cases often incorporate equal-protection as well as adequacy
arguments.
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money school districts must spend, but what school districts must do in
order to meet the demands of adequacy.
But adequacy is no easier for courts to manage than equality. The
itemized lists produced by courts struggling to define adequacy exemplify
judicial limitations. The bellwether New Jersey Supreme Court, while
continuing to insist that an "interim remedy" of "increased funding" is
the only way to discharge "the judicial obligation to vindicate constitu-
tional rights,"39 has also held that the right to a "thorough and efficient"
education under the New Jersey Constitution 4° requires the state to en-
sure that low-performing districts "implement whole-school reform; im-
plement full-day kindergarten and a half-day pre-school program for
three- and four-year olds as expeditiously as possible; [and] implement
[particular] technology, alternative school, accountability, and school-to-
work and college-transition programs."41 This list is preposterous in its
specificity: It is easy to imagine constitutionally adequate schools that
lack these elements, and even easier to imagine inadequate schools that
have them all.
Vagueness, rather than specificity, was the order of the day in the
leading case of Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, which invalidated the
Kentucky education code in its entirety.42 Rose lists seven "essential" and
"minimal" characteristics of constitutionally acceptable education.43 This
list, subsequently adopted by some other states,4 is uncontroversial only
because it is entirely hortatory. Adequate education, said the Kentucky
court, provides students with sufficient abilities in a range of disciplines
to allow them to function in a "complex and rapidly changing civiliza-
tion," to "make informed choices" in their personal and civic lives, and to
compete successfully in higher education and employment markets. 4 5 At
the same time, Rose emphatically declined to describe the specific pro-
grams necessary to a constitutionally adequate education, insisting that
this determination was the duty of the legislature.46 The legislature, with
no direction to speak of, passed a new education code; whether educa-
tion has improved in Kentucky remains unknown.47
39. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997).
40. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4(1).
41. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 473 (N.J. 1998).
42. 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
43. Id. at 212.
44. See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554-55
& n.92 (Mass. 1993); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
45. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. The North Carolina Supreme Court took the Rose
approach a step further, providing a laundry list of critical disciplines, including
economics, geography, and vocational skills as well as English, mathematics, history, and
physical science, but offering no priorities or achievement benchmarks. See Leandro, 488
S.E.2d at 255.
46. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
47. See generally Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 11 (describing the Kentucky school
code passed after Rose, the new code's early implementation, and the substantial
implementation problems that remained).
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Variations on the New Jersey and Kentucky approaches proliferate,
with commentators pressing various proposals under which courts would
order school officials to alter substantively the kind of education they of-
fer to students. 48 Professor Molly McUsic, for example, urges courts
faced with widespread educational inadequacy to adopt the model of Rose
and mandate whole-state, system-wide reforms. 49 Other proposals for
substantive remedies partake of New Jersey's impulse toward the direc-
tive. Professor Paul Weckstein cites several academic studies to argue that
courts should impose a particular "standards-based" model founded on a
"schoolwide teacher professional community" committed to "authentic
pedagogy."50 ProfessorJames Liebman cites different studies to advocate
judicial imposition of "'[s]chool-based management"' and "'[e]ffective
schools"' programs on "persistently unsuccessful schools."5 1
These proposals exemplify the difficulty that courts (and commenta-
tors) face in defining adequacy. But difficulties do not end with defini-
tion. Courts must also determine how much must be spent in order to
achieve adequacy.5 2 In addition, recognizing the insufficiency of all
strictly financial remedies, proponents of such proposals soon find them-
selves flirting with, if not neck-deep in, substantive, nuts-and-bolts inter-
vention in the details of curriculum, teaching, and school-level govern-
ance.53 Such interventions leave courts out of their depth, both
48. McUsic categorizes such reforms as "[s]tructural [s]hifts," a category that includes
both judicial specification of how educational services are to be improved and judicial
efforts to change how educational institutions are organized. McUsic, The Law's Role,
supra note 9, at 119. This Note argues that the distinction between these two types of
reform is important. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. This Note therefore uses
the term "substantive" to refer to remedies ordering changes in the content of educational
services, as distinguished from remedies that seek to alter the institutional "incentive
systems" that affect schooling. The latter term is due to Michael R. Kremer, Research on
Schooling: What We Know and What We Don't, 10 World Bank Res. Observer 247, 247
(1995).
49. See McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 134-86.
50. Paul Weckstein, School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality Education, in
Law and School Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity, supra note 9, at
306, 309, 311; see id. at 366 nn.12-13.
51. Liebman, Implementing Brown, supra note 35, at 393 n.148, 394 & nn.149-50
(quoting research supportive of these approaches published by the RAND Corporation
and the Center for Policy Research in Education). Liebman notes that these approaches
are "not yet proven... sufficiently to justify imposing on schools a common law duty to
adopt them," and advocates their judicial imposition only in the absence of effective
legislative action. Id. at 394.
52. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 693 A.2d 417, 429-33 (NJ. 1997); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57 (R.I. 1995) (referring to the "complex and elusive
relationship between funding and 'learner outcomes'"); William F. Dietz, Note,
Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform Litigation, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 1193,
1204-07 (1996) (discussing these and other cases); see also McUsic, The Law's Role, supra
note 9, at 116-17.
53. See Enrich, supra note 18, at 171-72; McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at
116-17; McMillan, supra note 7, at 1893-95. But see Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 429 (insisting
on the logical priority of fiscal remedies over the specification of substantive standards).
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substantively-because courts have no particular pedagogical expertise-
and institutionally-because courts lack access to the political processes
of policy development and bargaining that allow such contested decisions
to be made.
In short, the problem with judicially-crafted interventions in educa-
tional services has been less that courts feel constrained to avoid doing
good and more that courts feel-or should feel-unable to determine
what is good. Judges treat educational adequacy as a political question
not because they have a policy of abstention but because they feel incom-
petent to act.
Moreover, substantive judicial interventions suffer from another
problem already associated with financial remedies: Ordering reform is
very different from implementing it.4 The pitfalls of implementation are
well-known; 55 they justify in no small part doctrines like the political-ques-
tion and separation-of-powers rules that discourage judicial involvement
in delivery of domestic services. 56 The pitfalls of implementation in
schools are especially dramatic,57 particularly because the party ordered
to reform is the state, while the party that must carry out reforms is the
local school district. 58 Intergovernmental implementation lends itself
well to delay, confusion, conflict, and "token compliance," which one
scholar has described as "meeting the terms of the rules without con-
forming with their goals."59
Nevertheless, those who advocate substantive remedies typically ig-
nore implementation problems.60 They argue as if the fact that effective
54. See Heise, supra note 34, at 1761-63 (arguing that court-ordered reform of
school finance systems often fails to result in reductions in interdistrict fiscal inequities).
55. See generally Jeffrey L. Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How
Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland (3d ed. 1984).
56. See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59 (arguing that "chilling example" of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's involvement in education, notwithstanding what the Rhode Island
court describes as "the absence of justiciable standards," led to a "morass" in which the
"New Jersey Supreme Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education
for more than twenty-one years, consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court
attention"); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 15-16 (1991).
57. See Jeffrey IL Henig, Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor
180-84 (1994) (discussing implementation problems associated with school choice
programs); Paul Berman, From Compliance to Learning: Implementing Legally-Induced
Reform, in School Days, Rule Days: The Legalization and Regulation of Education 46,
46-49 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986).
58. See David V. Cohen, Policy and Organization: The Impact of State and Federal
Educational Policy on Sound Governance, 52 Harv. Educ. Rev. 474, 476-77, 488-89
(1982). The hierarchical structure of the state-school district relationship, in which the
former delegates much of its responsibility for education to the latter, raises many of the
implementation problems associated with federalism. See McMillan, supra note 7, at 1880
(noting that second-wave courts faced "federalism-like local control concerns").
59. Donald F. Kettl, The Regulation of American Federalism 8 (2d ed. 1987); see id.
at 10-14.
60. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 474 (1998) (after noting that
whether ordered remedies will have desired results "depends... on the extent to which
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methods for educating poor students are known-itself a dubious propo-
sition, notwithstanding the authors' (varying) citations to the education
scholarship-means that all courts need to do is order schools to adopt
those methods.61 Would that it were so easy.62
So long as litigants continue to request, and courts continue to im-
pose, remedies that tell states what to spend and schools what, how,
when, and whom to teach, the courts are likely to continue to generate
no visible improvement in deficient school districts. Courts must recog-
nize their own incapacity to define such remedies fairly and to impose
them in ways that will stick.
B. Incentive-Based Judicial Remedies
Awareness of judicial limits, however, does not justify judicial inac-
tion. Courts need not renounce any role in enforcing constitutionally-
guaranteed rights to education because effective control over educational
services is beyond their grasp. Instead, courts should redirect their atten-
tion towards remedies that target not the funding and content of educa-
tional programs but the incentives and circumstances of those who con-
trol them: legislatures, governors, and state and local educational
bureaucracies. Such remedies do more than self-consciously respectjudi-
cial limitations. They explicitly seek to harness capabilities unique to the
political branches: creativity over time, sustained commitment and flexi-
bility in public management, and political responsiveness to popular pref-
erences. This approach may induce desirable educational change in cir-
cumstances where a simple order or mandate to change would quickly
founder during implementation.63
Attention to incentives is now a well-established feature of public de-
bate over education reform; this is particularly evident in the burgeoning
there is a top-to-bottom commitment to ensuring that the reforms are conscientiously
undertaken and vigorously carried forward," applauding the commitment at the "top" by
the Commissioner of Education and the Legislature, but saying nothing about any
commitment at the "bottom").
61. See Weckstein, supra note 50, at 307 (arguing that there exists "professional
knowledge about... some key elements of high-quality education and what it takes to
provide it"). It is hard to see how Weckstein imagines that "schoolwide teacher
professional communit[ies]," id. at 311, will arise and begin to engage in authentic
pedagogy because a court tells them to. See also Ratner, supra note 34, at 780 (contending
that "effective schools do share common educational characteristics").
62. Incentive-based reforms like takeover and others discussed below, see infra Part
I.B, also may face implementation problems. See Christopher D. Pixley, The Next Frontier
in Public School Finance Reform: A Policy and Constitutional Analysis of School Choice
Legislation, 24J. Legis. 21, 45-47 (1998) (describing ways that bureaucratic recalcitrance
and other obstacles can stymie market-based reforms). But implementation is a far more
substantial barrier to the successful enactment of substantive reforms.
63. Such proposals are very different from Weckstein's proposals for standards-based
learning, supra note 50 and accompanying text, or Abbott's for "site-based management,"
Abbott V, 710 A.2d app. at 486. These proposals ask schools to run themselves differently,
but provide no reason to expect that schools that have run themselves badly under old
paradigms will suddenly reinvent themselves under the new.
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school choice and charter school movements64 (though neither of these
is commonly thought of as ajudicial remedy).65 Choice and charter pro-
posals are based on the idea that directive, top-down management of low-
quality schools, however well-intentioned, will usually fail, because it can-
not alter the institutional realities that produce inadequate schools in the
first place.6 6 By contrast, new approaches to governance, whether based
on market models (as in most school choice proposals) or models of bu-
reaucratic entrepreneurship (as in the charter school movement), seek to
create incentives that will foster success. Incentive-based proposals are
also self-implementing; a legislature (or a court) that alters institutional
structures need only issue a relatively easily enforceable order and then
assess outcomes, while avoiding indefinite entanglement in
administration.
Moreover, the logic of incentives extends beyond market-based pro-
posals. Professor McUsic suggests an intriguing structural reform, which
64. See Kathryn M. Doherty, Changing Urban Education: Defining the Issues, in
Changing Urban Education 225, 231 (Clarence N. Stone ed., 1998) ("With bureaucracy as
a target, public support for structural education reforms such as school privatization,
charter schools, and vouchers has grown in strength in the last decade."). See generally
Learning from School Choice (Paul E. Peterson & Bryan C. Hassel eds., 1998).
65. While much legal commentary on school choice has focused on its
constitutionality, see, e.g.,Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice and State Constitutional Law,
in Learning from School Choice, supra note 64, at 409-27 (discussing school choice and
the Establishment Clause); Pixley, supra note 54, at 47-64 (same); Suzanne H. Bauknight,
The Search for Constitutional School Choice, 27 J.L. & Educ. 525, 542-50 (1998)
(assessing the constitutionality of voucher programs in Ohio and Wisconsin), there have
been surprisingly few suggestions that choice could be an effective judicial remedy for
educational inadequacy, even though it requires changes in principle no more radical than
those suggested by Professors McUsic or Weckstein. See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text. But see Jenkins v. Leininger, 659 N.E.2d 1366, 1376-77 (I1. 1995)
(declining to reach the validity of a plaintiff's request for a voucher-based remedy, but
intimating that such a remedy would be disfavored in the Illinois courts); James E. Ryan,
Slwff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 529, 560-62 (1999)
(suggesting that school choice is an appropriate remedy for denial of rights to equal or
adequate education); Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in
Education Cases, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 808-12 (1995) (urging the adoption of voucher
remedies, at least on a limited basis, for students in deficient schools). The lack of interest
in choice as a remedy may be because school choice is not just a policy proposal but a
'pennant in the culture wars" hoisted by combatants generally hostile to judicial
intervention in education. Marshall J. Breger, School Vouchers-A Sympathetic View, in
Vouchers for School Choice: Challenge or Opportunity? 1, 1 (MarshallJ. Breger & David
M. Gordis eds., 1998).
66. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and
Secondary Education Enter the "Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive
Marketplace, 29J. Marshall L. Rev. 75, 86-88 (1995) (urging school choice on the grounds
that publicly managed education operates under a "flawed incentive system," similar to
that of the failed Soviet economy, that "fails to reward outstanding performance,
innovation, or production"); cf. James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L.
Rev. 619, 628 (1994) (arguing that because competition among schools is vital to the
success of choice programs, some "market-making act," such as the establishment of
charter schools, is necessary in order to give choice a fair trial).
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she dubs "class integration," for cases in which there are pockets of low-
performing school districts in a sea of relatively well-performing ones.
67
(This is the situation, for example, of a distressed inner-city district sur-
rounded by prosperous suburban districts.) McUsic proposes that courts
respond to such circumstances by redrawing school district boundaries so
that all districts serve families with a range of economic resources. 68
McUsic argues that this improves education for poorer students without
harming wealthier ones by making it more probable that all districts will
serve parents likely to take an active role in their children's education.
69
Structural reforms like McUsic's are attractive in their reliance on institu-
tional incentives. Redrawn districts would remain subject to political,
rather than judicial, authority; what would change would be the demands
parents place on district officials.
Of course, McUsic's proposal, like school choice, raises its own
problems. One wonders whether suburban parents drafted into new
mixed districts would provide all schools with incentives for effectiveness,
as McUsic suggests, or would begin to lose interest in their schools and
seek private alternatives.7 0 A more basic problem with McUsic's proposal
is its political inviability. McUsic amazingly calls her proposal "a path of
less resistance" than that of mandating financial remedies.7 1 Her analy-
sis, though thorough, seems wildly optimistic;72 more likely, the political
maelstrom that would emerge from an attempt to redraw suburban
school district lines to include urban students would make the battles
over financial equalization look like a summer squall.73
Thus, despite the attractiveness of these proposals' dependence on
incentives, as judicial remedies they are decidedly unappealing. Posi-
67. McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 128.
68. See id. at 131.
69. See id. at 129-30; see also James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 Yale LJ. 259,
294-95 (1991) (reviewingJohn E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's
Schools (1990)).
70. Declining support for public education appears to be associated with financial
remedies that redistribute school taxes to poorer school districts. See Heise, supra note 34,
at 1761; McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 112-114.
71. McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 120.
72. See id. at 131-34.
73. See Lillian B. Rubin, Busing and Backlash: White Against Black in a California
School District 22, 121 (1972) (describing furious community opposition to mixing
students by race and social class within a unified school district that had been created from
several smaller prosperous districts and one inner-city district). While the racial context of
the late 1960s was undoubtedly more openly polarized than that of today, and while school
district unifications in the late 1960s were motivated more by efficiency than by the virtues
of parental participation, see id. at 22, parents of students in well-performing schools will
probably still actively resist redrawing their district lines in ways that include poorly-
performing schools. See Thomas Corcoran & Nathan Scovronick, More Than Equal: New
Jersey's Quality Education Act, in Strategies for School Equity- Creating Productive
Schools in a Just Society, supra note 8, at 53, 63-65 (documenting dramatic political
backlash against efforts to equalize school funding in New Jersey's legislative,
gubernatorial, and senatorial elections in the early 1990s).
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tively, few courts, no matter what their view on the prudent range ofjudi-
cial activism in education, would be willing to take sides in the highly
charged and often partisan political battles associated with vouchers or
even class integration. Normatively, while these proposals' reliance on
incentives offers a partial solution to problems of judicial implementa-
tion, they seem to do so at the price of exacerbating problems ofjudicial
competence. The vulnerability ofjudicial specifications of the content of
educational services to charges of arbitrariness and incompetence would
be magnified tenfold were judges to seek radical redesign of the political
institutions that undergird American education.
One promising solution to this dilemma, however, lies in the re-
cently developed argument that the arbitrariness ofjudicially-determined
standards of educational adequacy can be ameliorated by using standards
articulated in existing state law-standards which exist in the education
codes of virtually every state.74 The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that
"the political difficult[y]" of "defin[ing] the meaning of the [state consti-
tution's adequacy provision] ... has been made simpler... because the
executive branch of the government has already promulgated educa-
tional standards pursuant to the legislature's directive.. . ."75 Such an
approach, Professor McUsic contends, is effective because "explicit stan-
dards for education" defined by "an elected branch of government,
either the legislature or the state department of education [,] ... provide
a voter-validated definition of minimum educational standards, which
can provide a basis for an effective adequacy claim." 76
This approach would do very little to address the problems of mana-
gerial inflexibility, political insensitivity, and fractured implementation as-
sociated with substantive judicial remedies.77 State education codes, how-
ever, do not only-or even primarily-address the substantive content of
education; instead, they focus on defining and organizing institutions
that deliver education. The structural provisions of state education codes
offer courts a way to counteract incentives that perpetuate inertia and
inadequacy. The statutory foundation of a state's educational institutions
should, therefore, be the first resort for courts interested in inducing pol-
iticians and bureaucrats to exert themselves to assure a decent education
for the children in their charge.
74. See McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 117.
75. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993);
see also Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 127-28, 131 (Ala. 1993) (building a case
for inadequacy by referring to the state code); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 805,
814-15 (111. 1999) (suggesting, in dicta, that well-pled allegations of state school code
violations may offer a cause of action to students in distressed schools); Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994) (holding Kansas schools to be adequate
by "utiliz[ing] as a base the standards enunciated by the legislature and the state
department of education").
76. McUsic, The Law's Role, supra note 9, at 117; see also Liebman, Implementing
Brown, supra note 35, at 380; Dietz, supra note 52, at 1212-18.
77. See supra notes 39-62 and accompanying text.
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The remainder of this Note assesses one incentive-based reform that
takes this approach. It argues that courts, faced with inadequately per-
forming school districts, should turn first to state statutes that authorize
the disestablishment of-i.e., the withdrawal of authority from-such dis-
tricts. Courts in states that have passed such statutes should order states
to invoke them, and either to run the districts directly or to transfer their
authority to a third party. The next Part describes this remedy, and its
state law background, in detail.
II. THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF DEFciECNT SCHOOL DismIc-rs
This Part outlines the major features of a proposal thatjudges order
states to disestablish school districts that fail to provide adequate educa-
tion in states whose school codes permit state officials to order such dises-
tablishment. It has two sections. The first section reviews the state-law
background of disestablishment, which would provide the legal founda-
tion for the remedy. The second section describes approaches courts
might take to disestablishment, and argues that disestablishment orders
fall within the limits ofjudicial competence and implementability.
A. Disestablishment under State Law
As we have seen, the right to an education is guaranteed by state
constitutions and is the responsibility of state authorities. Local school
districts, by contrast, typically have no constitutional status. Even the very
few state constitutions that require local governance for public schools
78
do not define particular powers for local school boards. Most state consti-
tutions, moreover, speak of a state responsibility to educate but are silent
as to local participation; in such states, school districts need not exist at
all.79 The universal American practice of local school governance,8 0
78. See Kan. Const. art. VI, § 5 ("Local public schools under the general supervision
of the state board of education shall be maintained, developed and operated by locally
elected boards"); Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 ("the Legislature are authorized, and it
shall be their duty to require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own
expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools"); Wis. Const. art. X, § 3
(requiring the legislature to "provide... for the establishment of district schools"); see also
Denise Howard, Rewarding and Sanctioning School District Performance by Decreasing or
Increasing the Level of State Control, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1996, at 187, 191
(discussing the Kansas requirements); c. Okla. Const. art. XIII, § la (funds shall be
allocated to the "various school districts"). Disestablishment might or might not violate the
Wisconsin provision, since, for example, a taken-over district is still a "district school." Cf.
Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 151-52 (Wis. 1976) (holding that Wisconsin's
constitutional requirements imply a protected local interest in school administration and
funding); Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24
Conn. L. Rev. 773, 782 (1992) (discussing Buse).
79. See generally Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1325, 1343-48 (1992) (listing state constitutional
provisions).
80. Hawaii is often noted as an exception to this "universal" pattern, since, unlike any
other state, it has a single statewide school district. See, e.g., David K. Cohen &James P.
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then, is not a matter of constitutional requirement but of "state policy":
States have chosen to discharge their obligation to educate by delegating
their power and responsibility over education to local school districts.8 '
Such local delegation is extensive. Despite their subordinate doctri-
nal status as "political subdivisions" 8 2 of the state and the quotidian reality
of state oversight, typically by a state department of education,83 school
districts generally enjoy wide discretion over educational services.8 4 The
range of powers delegated to local school authorities in the United States
contrasts strongly with European and other educational systems, which
are more highly centralized.85
Notwithstanding the policy of local delegation, however, school dis-
trict authority is contingent on a state grant of power. Therefore, a dis-
trict's authority to direct education in a locality can be made contingent
on its performance. Just as a state should withdraw a contract from an
underperforming contractor, or freeze a grant not being used to provide
the services the grant was to support, it ought to act similarly vis-4.-vis a
school district.
In the wake of the Reagan Administration's 1983 Nation at Risk
report,8 6 which called on states to address America's educational
crisis, 87 states began to integrate this principle into their educational ac-
Spillane, Policy and Practice: The Relations between Governance and Instruction, in
Designing Coherent Education Policy- Improving the System 35, 39 (Susan H. Fuhrman
ed., 1993). However, Hawaii's decision to adopt a single-district system is administrative.
As a matter of law, the Hawaii legislature authorizes the state education department to
create school districts at its discretion. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 302A-1142 (Michie
1998).
81. See, e.g., Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.002 (West 1996) ("The school districts...
created in accordance with the laws of this state have the primary responsibility for
implementing the state's system of public education .... ."); Carrolton-Farmers Branch
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 511 (Tex. 1992) (Texas
legislature has a "free hand" to establish school districts as it sees fit); Briffault, supra note
78, at 781 (arguing that "local control is state policy," which in large part resolves the
.apparent paradox" of simultaneous norms of state supremacy and local control).
82. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 777 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
83. See Briffault, supra note 78, at 780-81.
84. See Cohen & Spillane, supra note 80, at 38-39. Such discretion is not absolute.
Certain functions, such as textbook selection, are typically retained by states. See, e.g., Ga.
Code Ann. § 20-2-1010 (1996) ("The State Board of Education is authorized to
prescribe.., the textbooks to be used in... the public schools of this state .... ."); Tex.
Educ. Code Ann. §§ 31.023, 31.101 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999) (districts limited to state-
approved textbooks for subjects within the "foundation curriculum"). See generally
Briffault, supra note 78, at 780-83.
85. See Cohen & Spillane, supra note 80, at 39-40.
86. National Comm'n on Excellence in Educ., supra note 1.
87. Other state interventions pursued in this period included reforms in curriculum,
teacher certification, state monitoring, and special education. See Dennis P. Doyle et al.,
Taking Charge: State Action on School Reform in the 1980s 4-5 (1991); cf. Richard F.
Elmore, The Political Economy of State Influence, 16 Educ. & Urban Soc'y 125, 125 (1984)
(noting "enthusiasm" for state-level educational reform in the 1980s, but wondering if
states would overcome their traditionally weak role in educational policymaking).
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creditation and local governance statutes as a way to create "accountabil-
ity" for school districts.8 8 While these statutes vary in detail, a majority of
the states that have passed such laws follow the general approach of the
pioneering NewJersey takeover legislation:89 Upon determination that a
district is inadequate, the chief state education officer appoints a state
district school superintendent, responsible to the state education depart-
ment, who replaces (or at least exercises the powers of) the local superin-
tendent and elected school board.90 Other states give their education
officials the discretion to decide whether to take over or dissolve stub-
bornly deficient districts, with their territory, schools, students, and teach-
88. Michael W. Kirst & Allan Odden, National Initiatives and State Education Policy,
Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 99, Winter 1992-93, at 107-08.
89. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A.7A-15 to -16, -34 to -51 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999).
90. See Ala. Code § 16-6B-3(c) (3) (1995) (state superintendent of education to
.assume the direct management and day-to-day operation of the local board of education
[in deficient district] for such period as may be necessary for student achievement to
improve"); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-283(d) (3) (1996) (state board given right of action
against local school officials it believes to be blocking successful implementation of
corrective plans in deficient district, and court empowered to remove such officials and
appoint replacements); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 158.780, 158.785 (Michie 1996) (chief state
school officer or her designee to exercise all powers of local school board and
superintendent if state finds local management critically inefficient or ineffective); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 69, § 1K (LEXIS L. Pub. 1999) (state board to designate a receiver for a
chronically under-performing district "with all the powers of the superintendent and
school committee"; receiver to report to the state Commissioner of Education); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 115C-105.39 (1997) (requiring State Board of Education to replace the principal in
deficient district, and allowing board to appoint an "interim superintendent" to whom it
'may assign any of the powers and duties of the local superintendent and the local finance
officer," and to suspend the local school board if it fails to cooperate with the interim
superintendent); W. Va. Code § 18-2E-5(k) (Supp. 1998) (state authorities may limit
powers of local authorities or "declar[e] that the office of the county superintendent is
vacant"); infra note 91; cf. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 3 § 1 (S.B. 1) (West) (to
be codified at Cal. Educ. Code §§ 52053, 52055.5) (authorizing individual schools with
below-average academic performance to apply for state grant funds to improve that
performance; if grantee schools then fail to meet state performance standards or to show
significant performance improvements within two years, "the Superintendent of Public
Instruction shall assume all the legal rights, duties, and powers of the [district] governing
board with respect to that school"); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 160.538.2-3 (West Supp. 1999)
(authorizing state authorities to initiate a "recall election for each member of the district
school board" when any school in the district is found to be academically deficient, but
allowing voters to decide to retain any member); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1-602(c) (Supp.
1998) (state commissioner may "restrict the discretionary powers of the director of schools
or of the local board of education [in a deficient district] to ensure implementation" of the
recommendations produced by a study of the district); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3302.06(B)
(West 1995) (repealed 1998) (state board may appoint a "monitor" to implement a
remedial plan in deficient district); Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility &
Management Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the
District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
[hereinafter D.C. Control Board] has the authority to take control from the District's
Board of Education under the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and
Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-8, § 207(d) (1995), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 5203(f) (1996)).
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ers absorbed by neighboring districts. 91 Still other states have transferred
the power to select local school boards and to appoint superintendents in
troubled big-city school districts from local electorates to city mayors.9 2
And in 1999, Florida innovatively merged disestablishment and school
choice ideas to offer students attending schools determined by the state
to be "failing" a state voucher that can be used to attend a public or pri-
vate school of the family's choice.93
91. See 105 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-3.25f(b) (2) (West 1998) (state superintendent
may reassign pupils and administrative staff of a failing district or "nonrecognize" that
district; nonrecognized districts are merged into adjoining districts at the end of the school
year); Iowa Code Ann. § 256.11(12) (West 1996) (school accreditation committee faced
with a deficient district may choose among taking "temporary oversight authority," placing
district in receivership, or merging district with neighboring districts, with the choice to be
based on the "best interests of the students, parents, residents of the community, teachers,
administrators, and board members of the district"); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-17-6(11) (1999)
(state education authorities may declare "state of emergency" in deficient district and
choose to override particular decisions of the local school board, appoint a conservator for
the local board, or consolidate the district with its neighbors); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70,
§ 1210.541B (West 1998) (state board, at its option, may intervene in a number of ways in
deficient districts, including "operation of the school by personnel employed by the State
Department of Education; mandatory annexation of all or part of the local school district;
and placing operation of the school with an institution of higher learning [under certain
conditions]"); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 39.131 (a) (West 1996) (state board may assign
monitor or master, suspend the local board of trustees and local commissioner and replace
them with a new board of managers, or, after two years in which problems are not
remedied, annex the district to another district). Arkansas recently repealed a statute
requiring dissolution and merger for persistently inadequate districts. See Ark. Code Ann.
§ 6-15-418(a) (Michie 1993) (repealed 1999).
92. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Educ. §§ 4-302-303 (Supp. 1997) (Mayor of Baltimore
given power to replace Baltimore school superintendent and Baltimore Board of School
Commissioners); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3311.71(B) (West 1999) (providing for mayoral
appointment of a school board "[iw]henever any municipal school district is released by a
federal court from an order requiring ...management of the district by the state
superintendent"); cf. 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 10 (allowing for mayoral appointment of
"school reform boards" in first-class school districts and making such boards subject to
voter approval only after five years); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1-602(c) (Supp. 1998) (The
state board of education may remove some or all of the members of a local school board.
If only some members are removed, they are replaced by the "local legislative body" until
the next general election; if the entire board is dismissed, the state education
commissioner appoints replacements.). Note that in many places, the background
procedure is mayoral appointment of school board members; disestablishment in such
cases consists precisely in unseating and replacing mayoral appointees. The school board
in Jersey City, New Jersey, for example, was appointed by the Jersey City mayor until it was
taken over in 1989. See KennethJ. Tewel, The New Jersey Takeover Legislation: Help or
Hindrance to Improvement in Troubled School Districts, 23 Urb. Rev. 217, 220 (1991).
93. The state must find that the schools are "failing" for two consecutive years. 1999
Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 99-398 § 2 (West) (to be codified at Fla. Stat. ch. 229.0537).
Determination of failure is based upon state standardized tests. See id. at § 7 (to be
codified at Fla. Stat. ch. 229.57). Compare Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 158.6455(3) (f) (LEXIS L.
Pub. Supp. 1998), which includes "student transfer to successful [public] schools" among
the sanctions for schools that fail to meet performance thresholds.
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Clearly, a great deal rests upon how states determine that districts are
subject to these provisions-i.e., how they identify inadequate districts.
In a few cases, state legislatures have statutorily identified particular dis-
tricts as inadequate and provided for their takeover or dissolution; this is
more common when states seek to turn school districts over to city may-
ors,94 but has also been used for state takeovers.95 More commonly, the
state codes set out criteria which, if unmet, trigger a monitoring and im-
provement process. Typically, triggers for the initial round of monitoring
are objective, incorporating measures such as test scores and attend-
ance.96 Such triggers generally lead to state/local cooperation in the de-
velopment of a remedial plan.9 7 Actual disestablishment of a district usu-
ally requires not only objectively measured educational inadequacy but
the subjective decision of state education officials that a district is failing
to implement its remedial plan adequately.98
The relatively lengthy period during which districts are allowed to
attempt to remedy their deficiencies99 not only gives districts every oppor-
94. See, e.g., 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/34-3 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (mayoral
appointment of school reform board in Chicago); Md. Code Ann., Educ. §§ 4-302-303
(Supp. 1997) (mayoral control over school governance, subject to state oversight, in
Baltimore); cf. Beth Reinhard, In Baltimore, A New Team Takes Charge, Educ. Wk., Oct.
1, 1997, at 14 (describing the "city-state partnership" established in Baltimore, and
characterizing it as falling short of a "wholesale state takeover").
95. See 1995 N.Y. Laws 145 § 3(i)-j) (takeover provisions specific to Roosevelt, Long
Island).
96. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6B-3(c) (1995) (defining districts "in need of assistance,"
which are ultimately subject to state administration, in terms of student performance on
standardized tests); 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 3 § 1 (S.B. 1) (West) (to be
codified at Cal. Educ. Code § 52052) (specifying an "Academic Performance Index" for
the measurement of academic performance that includes specified standardized test
scores, attendance rates, and graduation rates); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 39.051 (West 1996
& Supp. 1999) (indicators include dropout and attendance rates as well as test scores); 703
Ky. Admin. Regs. 3:205 § 1(1) (1999) (state to review routine instructional data in first-
stage assessments). But see Iowa Code Ann. § 256.11(10) (West 1996) (including
subjective evaluations based on site visits among initial monitoring criteria). Of course, the
generality of such standards can be illusory, since they can be tailored by legislatures to fit
particular districts. In New Jersey, for example, the takeover law, which is phrased as
general legislation, was passed with the full knowledge of all concerned that it targeted the
Jersey City school system. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Kean and Jersey City Mayor Clash On
Schools, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at BI (reporting that New Jersey Governor Thomas
Kean placed Jersey City "at the top of his list" of potential takeover targets during
consideration of the NewJersey takeover statute).
97. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6B-3(c) (1995); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-283(a) (1996); 105
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-3.25d (West 1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 256.11(10)-(11) (West
1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 69 § 1J (LEXIS L. Pub. Supp. 1999); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-17-
6(10) (b) (1999); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A.7A-14(b) (West Supp. 1999); Tex. Educ. Code Ann.
§ 39.131(a) (3) (West 1996); W. Va. Code § 18-2E-5 (k) (4) (LEXIS L. Pub. Supp. 1999).
98. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6B-3(c)(3) (1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 256.11(10-12)
(West 1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 69, § 1J (LEXIS L. Pub. Supp. 1999); NJ. Stat. Ann.
§ 18A.7A-14(b) (West Supp. 1999); 703 Ky. Admin. Regs. 3:205 §§ 1(2), 1(3), 2 (1999).
99. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-6B-3(d) (1995) ("Intervention by the State Board of
Education is to occur only after the three-year period provided.... ."); 105 111. Comp. Stat.
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tunity for reform but also works to blunt political opposition to district
disestablishment. The disestablishment statutes also incorporate other
devices that are likely to dampen political resistance. Disestablishment
provisions are designed to be revenue-neutral; state expenses are to result
in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in state aid to the district, presumably re-
sulting in a wash. 100 Some states have also sought to mute the political
opposition of organized labor with severe limitations on the ability of
newly-appointed school officials to remove teachers or violate collective
bargaining agreements. 10 1
Notwithstanding the lengthy probationary periods, most states that
have passed statutes allowing them to disestablish school districts have
used them. Kentucky initiated the contemporary trend in school take-
overs when it took over two county school systems in 1989.102 The same
year, immediately upon passage of its takeover law, New Jersey invoked it
Ann. 5/2-3.25f(b) (West 1998) (two-year period); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1-602(c) (Supp.
1997) (two-year period).
100. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 18A.7A-35 (c) (West Supp. 1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3302.06(B) (West 1995) (repealed). This reduction is putatively reasonable because
displaced local officials no longer need to be paid.
101. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 69, § 1J (LEXIS L. Pub. Supp. 1999) (state school
officials can dismiss teachers with "professional teacher status" only with "good cause" and
five days' notice); 1993 Mass. Acts ch. 71 § 77 (disestablishment provisions do not apply to
employees subject to collective bargaining agreements predating those provisions); NJ.
Stat. Ann. § 18A-7A-40(a) (West 1989) ("collective bargaining agreements entered into by
the school district shall remain in force" upon state takeover); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 158.6455(5)(d) (Michie 1996) (repealed 1998) (recommendations to remove teachers
from taken-over schools subject to collective bargaining agreements); see also RichardJ.
Carson, Perceptions of Educational and Political Leaders of the Creation of a State
Operated School District in NewJersey 62 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple
University) (noting that critical support for the New Jersey takeover legislation from the
New Jersey Education Association, "[t]he most active special interest group," was secured
only by agreement to strongly limit state-appointed superintendents' ability to remove
tenured principals); Michael D. Rettig, Policy Adaptation and Change: The Case of the
State Takeover of the Jersey City, NewJersey Public Schools 7 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Virginia) (same). But see Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 4-316 (Supp.
1998) (allowing the mayorally-appointed Baltimore school board to remove as well as
appoint teachers); Anthony S. Bryk et al., Chicago School Reform, in New Schools for a
New Century 164, 188 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 1997) (provisions for
mayor of Chicago, upon gaining control of the Chicago schools, to revoke teacher tenure).
Restrictions on hiring and firing obviously substantially constrain administrators' ability to
effect change at the school level.
102. See Reagan Walker, 2 Kentucky Districts Deemed 'Deficient,' Face State
Takeover, Educ. Wk.,Jan. 18, 1989, at 1. The Kentucky takeovers were initially challenged
by the taken-over districts, see Whitley County Bd. of Educ. v. Brock, No. 89-CI-0302
(Franklin Cir. Ct. Div. II Jan. 5, 1990), but litigation and the takeovers were halted when
the Kentucky Supreme Court declared the entire Kentucky education code, including the
existing takeover law, unconstitutional. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989). Following Rose, Kentucky reenacted its takeover provisions,
see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 158.780, 158.785 (Michie 1996), and made additional temporary
provisions for taking over districts where academic performance was subpar, see Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 158.6455(7) (Michie 1996) (repealed 1998); id. § 158.685(4) (expired 1996).
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to take over the Jersey City schools.'0 3 Since that time, at least fifteen
states have taken over one or more school districts. 10 4 Recent years have
also seen the consolidation of deficient districts, 10 5 the transfer of author-
ity to big-city mayors, 10 6 and other sorts of disestablishment. 10 7
Courts that have assessed the legality of disestablishment statutes and
associated administrative actions have held them to be well within consti-
tutional requirements and the licit discretion of state education authori-
ties.10 8 Courts also occasionally refer to the fact of takeover as evidence
of educational adequacy or inadequacy without commenting on the de-
sirability of takeover or its availability as a potential remedy.'0 9
103. See Robert Hanley, NewJersey Seizes School District in Jersey City, Citing Total
Failure, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at Al; Charles Mahtesian, Whose Schools?, Governing,
Sept. 1997, at 34, 34-35.
104. See David R. Berman, Takeovers of Local Governments: An Overview and
Evaluation of State Policies, Publius, Summer 1995, at 56 n.1 (listing disestablished districts
in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, NewJersey, Ohio, Kentucky, New York,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia); Reed Branson, Fordice Ends
State Rule of N. Panola Schools, Memphis Commerical Appeal, Aug. 2, 1997, at B2 (three
disestablished districts in Mississippi); Karen Diegmueller, Academic Deficiencies Force
Takeover of Calif. District, Educ. Wk., Sept. 16, 1992, at 21 (disestablishment in Compton,
California); Gloria A. Hoffher, Pa. Seizes Chester Schools, Phila. InquirerJune 14, 1994, at
BI (three disestablished districts in Pennsylvania); see also Beth Reinhard, Thompson
Threatens a Takeover for Milwaukee, Educ. Wk., Jan. 28, 1998, at 14 (gubernatorial threat
of state takeover in Milwaukee). Some of these takeovers are only partial: States
repossessed key district functions, such as control over finances, but left a nominal district
government in place.
105. See Jim Killackey, First School Closed for Low Marks, Daily Oklahoman, Aug. 28,
1992, at 1 (consolidation of schools into neighboring districts in Alluwe, Oklahoma).
106. See Bryk et al., supra note 101, at 187-89 (mayoral takeover in Chicago);
Reinhard, supra note 94, at 14 (partial mayoral takeover in Baltimore); Pete Waldmeir,
Archer Hits Ground Running in Reforming Detroit Schools, Detroit News, May 29, 1999, at
DI (describing first steps in the mayoral takeover in Detroit).
107. See Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility & Management Assistance
Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing the federally created D.C. Control
Board's decision to replace the D.C. Board of Education with an "Emergency Transitional
Education Board of Trustees"); id. at 781, 783-84 (upholding the federal displacement of
local authority while overturning the delegation of Control Board powers to the
Emergency Trustees); Stephen R. Cook, Comment, Tough Love in the District:
Management Reform Under the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and
Management Assistance Act, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 993, 1017-19 (1998) (describing D.C.
Control Board measures following Shook to perpetuate direct federal control over the D.C.
schools consistent with Shook's holding); Florida Beginning Voucher Plan for Education,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1999, at A15 (reporting that Florida's program providing vouchers
that allow students to bypass failing schools is now available to some students in the
Pensacola school district in the 1999-2000 school year).
108. See Spivey v. Ohio, 999 F. Supp. 987, 999 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (mayoral authority
over schools consistent with U.S. and Ohio Constitutions); Contini v. Board of Educ., 668
A.2d 434, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (upholding propriety of state takeover in
Newark, New Jersey).
109. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 693 A.2d 417, 440-41 (NJ. 1997).
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B. Disestablishment as Remedy
The particular form of court-ordered disestablishment will depend
both on the specific language of the state's disestablishment statute' 1 0
and on the nature of the educational deficiencies before the court.
Courts could order state education officials to undertake a variety of ac-
tions, from listing a district as a potential takeover target, thus initiating
the planning, audit, and oversight requirements associated with such a
listing, to invoking their discretion to disestablish a particular district that
met statutory criteria, to simply implementing a general accountability
monitoring regime, including the disestablishment sanction, without
targeting any particular district.
Questions of judicial competence aside, courts sitting in equity
clearly may, and sometimes do, issue disestablishment orders. In 1992,
an inferior state court in California required state officials to take over a
bankrupt school district so that its students could complete the school
year."' The California Supreme Court, in upholding that order, held
that "takeover ... was within [the courts'] inherent equitable power to
enforce the State's constitutional obligations" under emergency condi-
tions.11 2 In the court's view, takeover was not only "tailored to the harm
at issue," i.e., inadequate education, but met the requirements that equi-
table remedies be "the least disruptive" possible and "respect the separate
constitutional roles of the Executive and the Legislature."' " 3 Similar
views were presumably held by the federal district court in Ohio that or-
dered a state takeover of the Cleveland school system when district offi-
cials failed to implement court-ordered school desegregation
adequately." 4
Indeed, disestablishment is probably within judicial power even in
states that lack disestablishment statutes. Neither the California nor Ohio
orders made reference to statutory authority. Disestablishment might
thus be justified solely on the basis of the principle that it is the responsi-
110. For variation in state statutes, see supra notes 89-101.
111. See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992).
112. Id. at 1258.
113. Id.; see id. at 1258-60.
114. See Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533, 1537-38 & n.1, 1558-61 (N.D. Ohio
1996) (referring to an unpublished order requiring the Ohio State Board of Education to
take over management of the Cleveland schools from the Cleveland school district, and
characterizing the district's administration of a desegregation order as "politicized fiscal
and administrative mismanagement... without fiscal ... accountability or direction, and
incapable of implementing the Court's extant remedial orders"); cf. Jenkins v. Missouri,
959 F. Supp. 1151, 1178 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (Clark, J.) (urging, though not ordering, state
oversight of the Kansas City School District's operations as the district moves towards
unitary status, on the grounds that district leadership is "not up to th[e] task"). Courts
have also insisted on state oversight of narrower sectors of district educational policy. See,
e.g., Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Ariz. 1997) ("Local control does not include
the freedom of a district to go below the state system by choosing not to finance adequate
capital facilities.").
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bility of the state, not of school districts, to educate children.115 Courts
need no statutory sanction to see in disestablishment a straightforward
and necessary remedy where the state has delegated its own constitutional
responsibilities to demonstrably incompetent agents with no independ-
ent constitutional status. 116
A disestablishment remedy also offers courts an opportunity to avoid
implementation problems.117 It requires a single order and no ongoing
involvement in educational administration by the court. 118 Educational
administration remains the responsibility of a political branch of govern-
ment. 1 9 The remedy also offers courts political advantages: Because its
intervention in troubled districts leaves most other districts unaffected-a
characteristic emphatically not shared by financial or substantive reme-
dies-potential political fallout is mitigated, and judicial concerns about
overinvolvement in education are addressed. 2 0
115. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989)
("The sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools is that of our
General Assembly. It is a duty.... This obligation cannot be shifted to local counties and
local school districts."); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516, 548 (Mass. 1993) ("While it is dearly within the power of the Commonwealth to
delegate some of the implementation of the duty [to educate] to local governments, such
power does not include a right to abdicate the obligation imposed on [state] magistrates
and Legislatures placed on them by the Constitution."); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IM), 693
A.2d 417, 435 (NJ. 1997) ("The State ... cannot shirk its constitutional obligation under
the guise of local autonomy."); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1272
(Wyo. 1995) ("The problems associated with local control were known to the framers [of
the Wyoming Constitution], and they addressed them by vesting authority, responsibility,
and control in the state legislature, effectively ensuring that the state would establish the
education system.") (emphasis omitted).
116. See Ronald T. Hyman, State-Operated Local School Districts in NewJersey, 96
Educ. L. Rep. 915, 917 (1995) ("[The education] clause in the state constitution... serves
as the legal foundation for the claims for [both] equitable funding and the action of the
state to operate a local school district when ... trouble arises."); supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
118. The argument that disestablishment offers a solution to problems of judicial
implementability was made, quite presciently, with regard to the New Jersey courts
immediately upon the passage of that state's disestablishment statute. See F. Clinton
Broden, Note, Litigating State Constitutional Rights to an Adequate Education and the
Remedy of State Operated School Districts, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 779, 809-13 (1990).
Broden notes that court-ordered state takeover would "remov[e] the trial courtjudge from
the political fray and the non-legal, polycentric problems of managing a school district"
and would allow the courts to "avoid making political policy judgments surrounding
educational decisions." Id. at 812. Although Broden does not distinguish between positive
and normative aspects of political-question and separation-of-powers doctrines, these
arguments remain apt.
119. Broden also notes, correctly, that court-ordered disestablishment respects the
separation of powers by keeping control of services in the hands of the legislature. See id.
at 813.
120. One of the earliest statements of the third-wave strategy noted that "[o]nly when
a school district chronically failed to meet the [minimum adequacy] standard would the
state intervene in the administration of that district, while other districts would remain
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While statutory authority is not necessary for judges to order disestab-
lishment, and while advantages related to implementation do not depend
on a disestablishment statute, courts should be very reluctant to redesign
a state's political institutions without statutory sanction. Proper political
organization of education, even more than proper curriculum or class
size, is a paradigmatic "political question"-in both the positive and nor-
mative senses. No court that has declined to order financial or substan-
tive remedies in order to respect political-question or separation-of-pow-
ers limitations would find it more acceptable to wrest control over
political institutions from the legislature. And those courts that have
been willing to order financial or substantive remedies would still likely
refuse to intrude on a function so essentially legislative as the delegation
of authority to school districts, just as, for example, they would be unwill-
ing to order a school choice regime without legislative authority.
12 1
Given a disestablishment statute, however, this reluctance should
evaporate. Courts ordering disestablishment with statutory sanction are
merely ordering that bureaucratic reality be made consistent with legisla-
tive policy.122 Indeed, a disestablishment remedy may be particularly at-
tractive to those state courts that have recognized the paramount obliga-
tion of the state legislature vis-a-vis local school districts but have been
unwilling to invalidate interdistrict financial inequities. 123 While the first
plaintiffs to request the remedial disestablishment of a failing school dis-
trict in a state supreme court were recently turned away, the resulting
unaffected." McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses, supra note 32, at 328. While this has
not been true of third-wave remedies advocated to date, it does apply to disestablishment.
121. Here Broden's argument falls apart. Although Broden writes in the wake of New
Jersey's pioneering takeover statute, he never suggests that the statute is a necessary or
even desirable prerequisite to the use of takeover as ajudicial remedy. Indeed, in arguing
that disestablishment comports with "judicial competence or legitimacy," Broden, supra
note 118, at 813, Broden praises open-ended judicial standards on the grounds that
"judicial discretion may be a necessary and therefore legitimate substitute for political
discretion." Id. at 810 (quoting William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:
Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 637 (1982)). It seems
unlikely that many courts would agree.
122. Of course, state education codes make disestablishment a function not only of
the failure to meet objective criteria but of a discretionary administrative determination as
well. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Review of such discretion, however, is
routine for courts.
123. See, e.g., Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1186, 1196 (Ill.
1996) (noting the Illinois constitutional requirement that "[t]he State has the primary
responsibility for financing... education," but declining to order financial remedies); Fair
Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1138, 1143 (Okla. 1987) (holding that the
Oklahoma Constitution places responsibility for public education on the legislature, but
refusing to order financial remedies because of the simultaneous inclusion in the
constitution of provisions authorizing an ad valorem property tax for education-related
purposes). But see City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 55 (R.I. 1995) (holding that
the constitutional "duty of the general assembly to promote public schools . . . and to
adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education," R.I. Const. art. XII, § 1, confers no right to an
"equal, adequate, and meaningful education").
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decision suggested that a statutorily-based argument might eventually
command its assent.124 If that suggestion bears fruit, statutorily-based dis-
establishment offers a remedy well matched to a violation of a statutorily-
defined right.
III. THE MORNING AFTER: DIsEsTABLIsHMENT AS A TOOL FOR POSITIvE
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE
Doctrinal questions aside, the primary test of disestablishment, as of
any other structural remedy, must be whether it is likely to help children
attending inadequate schools. This Part, which consists of two sections,
argues that it is. The first section presents theoretical and structural rea-
sons that disestablishment should improve incentives in poor schools.
The second discusses the relatively meager empirical record that disestab-
lishment efforts associated with state takeovers have generated since
1989.
A. Disestablishment and Educational Incentives
1. Incentive-Based Critiques of Educational Governance. - Many critics
of American schools, if asked to consider disestablishment as a potential
remedy for academic deficiency, would be immediately dismissive. They
would concede that disestablishment, unlike, for example, school finance
reform, focuses on exactly the right problem: the management of
schools. But these critics-whether on the left or the right-would also
say that disestablishment is precisely the wrong solution. All it does is
replace local school bureaucrats with state (or, in the less frequent case,
mayoral) bureaucrats; it's just more of the same, failed approach.
Such arguments cast some doubt on the remedy's potential. In their
famous brief for school choice, Professors John Chubb and Terry Moe
claim poor school management is "inherent" in "institutions of demo-
cratic control."1 25 Chubb and Moe argue that subjecting schools to popu-
lar government unavoidably opens them up to constituencies with inter-
124. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 801-02, 814-15 (IU. 1999). The suit
was brought on behalf of students in East Saint Louis, Illinois, a school district infamous
for its decrepitude, see Kozol, supra note 12, at 23-39, and one whose financial affairs had
already been under state control since 1994, see Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 801; Berman, supra
note 104, at 56 n.1. Lewis E. held that the plaintiff's claim under the state constitution was
"solely for the legislative branch to answer," 710 N.E.2d at 802 (quoting Committee for Educ.
Rights, 672 N.E.2d at 1189). The Lewis E. court thus suggested, erroneously in my view,
that political-question and separation-of-powers arguments for nonintervention in
educational matters do not depend on whether the requested remedy is financial or
incentive-based. (The Lewis E. plaintiffs also requested financial support for remedial
programs, see 710 N.E.2d at 802.) At the same time, the Lewis E. court suggested that
where the constitutional claim faled, a well-pled mandamus action based on the Illinois
school code might succeed. See id. at 814-15. Reliance on the code for the remedy as well
as for the right might further increase the chances of success.
125. John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools 188
(1990).
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ests other than the education of children.1 26 The failure to emphasize
education "is not something that is temporary or the product of mistakes"
but "is deeply anchored in the most fundamental properties of the sys-
tem."127 Disestablished, publicly-run schools would presumably suffer no
less from these deficiencies than those where local authority remained
intact.'28
While Chubb and Moe have been thoroughly criticized on both
methodological 129 and policy grounds, 130 more moderate versions of
their claim that political and educational interests often diverge in public
schools, typically to education's detriment, are quite widely accepted.' 3'
Somewhat ironically, this view has even influenced current reform fash-
ions in the educational establishment, where school-based decisionmak-
ing and radical decentralization are now touted as solutions to America's
educational woes.' 3 2 For Chubb and Moe, disestablishment is arguably
pointless; but for advocates of decentralization, it is positively pernicious,
since its emphasis on increased state control represents movement away
from local governance. Decentralization advocates would likely find in
state or mayoral school administrations the same (if not more) rigidity,
hierarchy, and stifling of the life of the mind that they object to in stan-
dard schools. 133
126. See id. at 32 ("The schools are agencies of society as a whole, and everyone has a
right to participate in their governance. Parents and students have a right to participate
too. But they have no right to win. In the end, they have to take what society gives
them.").
127. Id. at 188.
128. See id. at 30 (noting that states as well as school districts participate in school
governance and are subject to the authors' critique).
129. See, e.g., Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, Science or Policy Argument?, in
School Choice: Examining the Evidence 185 (Edith Rasell & Richard Rothstein eds.,
1993). For a response, seeJohn E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, The Forest and the Trees: A
Response to Our Critics, in School Choice: Examining the Evidence, supra, at 219,
221-37.
130. See, e.g., Henig, supra note 57, at 7-25, passim; Liebman, Voice, Not Choice,
supra note 69, at 277-293.
131. See, e.g., Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of Coherence, in Designing Coherent
Education Policy: Improving the System, supra note 80, at 1, 6 (noting that "[e]ducators
may believe it is in their self-interest to keep policymakers out of educational business,"
though urging them to moderate this belief);John E. BrandI, Governance and Educational
Quality, in Learning from School Choice, supra note 64, at 55, 55-56.
132. See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 50, at 313 ("Strongly democratic schools, with
joint decision-making based on a school-parent consensus about mission, had the best
impact when compared with either adversarial or consolidated principal power models.");
Janet M. Ferguson & Paul Nochelski, The Power of Letting Go, Am. Sch. Board J., Apr.
1996, at 37; Starita Smith, School by School, Am. Sch. Board J., June 1998, at 22.
133. See, e.g., Theodore Sizer, Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American
High School 206 (1984) (associating "state governments becom[ing] more involved in the
regulation of the schools" with "hierarchical bureaucracy finally run totally amok").
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These critics are right to focus on the ways that incentives lead edu-
cation policies to diverge from educational needs.' 3 4 However, they
often seem to forget that bureaucratic and political incentives are not
fixed concomitants of institutional arrangements. They therefore attri-
bute failures too quickly to overarching approaches to governance-cen-
tral control for advocates of school-based governance, public manage-
ment of any kind for choice proponents-rather than asking, more
conservatively, how existing institutions might be modified to create
more salutary incentives. Choice advocates like Chubb and Moe seem
not even to contemplate the possibility that educational competition
could be enhanced by way of political institutions rather than markets.
Disestablishment, which alters the relationship between state and school
district without abolishing either, does precisely that.
Disestablishment, therefore, should be imposed by courts-and, in-
deed, adopted by states-if it improves incentives. The remainder of this
Part considers the incentives that are likely to flow from the operation
(and the judicially-mandated enforcement) of disestablishment provi-
sions that replace local school bureaucrats with state (or, in the rarer
case, mayoral) appointees. It should be emphasized, however, that dises-
tablishment is a differential policy that applies only to inadequate dis-
tricts.'8 5 Even absent systematic differences between state and local
school bureaucrats, replacing local bureaucrats who have demonstrated
their inadequacy is almost certain to be an improvement. Conversely, the
incentives faced by clearly competent school districts shift almost imper-
ceptibly under a disestablishment regime.
2. Incentives at the District Level. - There are several ways that dises-
tablishment might improve institutional incentives for officials entrusted
with failing schools. First, local school bureaucrats may be subject to par-
ticularly harmful incentives not shared by state bureaucrats. One reason
for this is that school districts are often the largest employer in poor corn-
munities. 136 District officials, dependent on and close to the local electo-
134. Cf. Brandi, supra note 131, at 64-65 ("No one should . . . dismiss[ ] this
argument as bureaucrat or teacher bashing. The argument presumes that government
employees are similar in their proclivities and talents to everyone else.").
135. See Susan H. Fuhrman & Richard F. Elmore, Takeover and Deregulation:
Working Models of New State and Local Regulatory Relationships 3 (Consortium for Policy
Research in Educ., Eagleton Inst. of Politics at Rutgers Univ., Research Report Apr. 1992).
Fuhrman and Elmore's summary report is supplemented by two case studies prepared by
their assistants. See Patricia Fry et al., Kentucky's Program for Educationally Deficient
School Districts: A Case Study (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., Eagleton Inst. of
Politics at Rutgers Univ., Research Report 1992) (Floyd and Whifley Counties); Margaret
Dolan-Dabrowski, A Case Study of the First Year of State Control of the Jersey City Public
Schools (1992) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Rutgers Graduate School of Education)
(Jersey City).
136. See Wilbur C. Rich, Black Mayors and School Politics 4-5 (1996) ("Schools are
one of the major linchpins of the urban economy... School districts have big budgets,
hiring thousands of local residents and purchasing a variety of products and services....
School districts generate millions of dollars for the local economy."); Fry, supra note 135,
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rate, but functioning with relatively little visibility or media attention, thus
face demands for employment, and sometimes for patronage and nepo-
tism, that can be at least as strong as demands for quality education.137
Temptations and opportunities for corruption may also be greater at the
district than at the state level.' 3 8
Second, state-appointed school superintendents need answer to no
one at the local level; they are responsible to only one government-the
state government-rather than two.' 3 9 State-appointed school officials
thus enjoy unusual freedom of action.140 More important, if disestablish-
ment is a realistic threat-either because states pursue it on their own
accord or because courts order them to do so-district personnel gain a
strong incentive to succeed: They fail at the price of theirjobs.' 4' A well-
advertised disestablishment regime thus may deter nonfeasance and mal-
feasance by local school officials. 142
at 15 (noting that the Floyd County School District was its county's largest employer when
taken over by Kentucky in 1989); Mahtesian, supra note 103, at 37 (quoting Dr. Beverly
Hall, state-appointed superintendent of the Newark, New Jersey, school district following
takeover, as stating, "When you get down to it, this is all about a $500 million budget-the
largest employment agency in Newark.").
137. See Rich, supra note 136, at 5; Clarence N. Stone, Introduction: Urban
Education in Political Context, in Changing Urban Education, supra note 64, at 1, 9
("[T]he protection of jobs and career ladders is often at the heart of how education
politics is organized."); see, e.g., Peter Applebome, Failure Calls Illinois City Home Turf,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1994, at A16 (reporting "contracts and jobs apportioned to friends or
relatives of school board members" in East Saint Louis, Illinois); Caroline Hendrie, Calif.
District Takeover Faces Political Threat, Educ. Wk., June 11, 1997, at 5 (reporting
"nepotism, corruption, and graft that had really run the [Compton, California] district
into the ground"); Wayne King, Longer Year Is Advocated For Schools, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6,
1992, at BI (reporting "[blid-rigging, kickbacks, payoffs, nepotism and featherbedding" in
the Jersey City school system).
138. Corruption has been a motivating force behind many of the takeovers that states
have undertaken without court pressure. See, e.g., Caroline Hendrie, Ill Will Comes 'With
Territory in Takeovers, Educ. Wk., June 12, 1996, at 1 (charges of corruption and missing
funds leading to an IRS and FBI raid on school district headquarters in the Texas school
district of Wilmer-Hutchins).
139. See Laval S. Wilson, Takeover. The Paterson Story, Am. Sch. BoardJ., Dec. 1994,
at 22, 22.
140. See id. at 22, 25. Wilson, the state-appointed superintendent of the Paterson,
New Jersey, schools, writes: "I serve not only as superintendent but.., as school board,
too.... Being a chief school officer who has a school board's authority to make decisions
is every superintendent's dream.... How long would it have taken to persuade the local
school board of the merits of various reforms?"
141. See Fuhrman & Elmore, supra note 135, at 27 (noting that takeover laws may
have "a deterrent effect on troubled districts and schools," but saying that deterrence was
outside the scope of their study).
142. Disestablishment is becoming a well-enough established feature of the political
landscape to appear injournalists' accounts of the perils facing school administrators. See,
e.g., Daniel McGinn, The Big Score, Newsweek, Sept. 6, 1999, at 47, 47 (noting that the
school accountability movement has meant that "[e]ducators can lose pay or be fired;
schools can face state takeover"); Sorting Out School Choice, The Economist, Sept. 4,
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The critique of the current system of public school governance by
advocates of school choice rests on the principle that school officials face
no negative consequences for poor performance. 143 Top-down substan-
tive reforms, like those proposed by Professors McUsic, Weckstein, and
others, do not alter these incentives.' 44 Choice would, in theory, provide
such incentives, but only contingently: Even schools that educate poorly
may succeed, or succeed for a while, depending on a host of factors, such
as the extent of competition, the nature of the student population, levels
of consumer information, and so on. By contrast, disestablishment
laws-especially those being enforced under judicial mandate-deter in-
competence much more directly.145 Indeed, the changes in policy and
practice made in school districts that are sensitive enough to the threat of
takeover to ultimately avoid its sanction may be the great successes of
academic bankruptcy policy, while taken-over districts may represent its
failures. 146 A fully successful takeover policy would result in no takeovers.
Disestablishment thus offers an alternative both to hierarchical bu-
reaucracy and to the market. It is a model of intergovernmental, rather
than private, competition over control of schools. It responds to the insti-
tutional critique of those who advocate competitive markets for K-12 ed-
ucation; like school choice, it relies on the self-interest of district officials,
rather than on top-down bureaucratic pronouncements, to produce re-
sults. At the same time, by harnessing the state/district intergovernmen-
tal structure of American education, the approach offers those who es-
chew private educational markets a thoroughly public approach to
structural reform. 147
3. Incentives at the State Level. - Potential incentives for state officials
are less clear-cut. The critical problem with the operation of a disestab-
lishment remedy at the state level is exactly the opposite of the problem
with school finance reform or redrawing school district lines: It is likely
1999, at 33, 34 (describing the Florida disestablishment statute, see supra note 89, as an
effort to "shake up the public-school system throughout the state").
143. See Michael Cohen & Chester E. Finn, Jr., A Dialogue Between Two Educators,
in School Choice: Examining the Evidence, supra note 129, at 319 (views of Chester Finn).
144. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
145. Some of the legislators involved in passing the New Jersey takeover law viewed
deterrence as a primary feature of the takeover regime. See Dolan-Dabrowski, supra note
135, at 12.
146. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) ("Texas hopes that there
will be no need to appoint a master or management team for any district" under its
takeover legislation).
147. Arguments against reliance on markets are extensive. Opponents worry that
market forces will exacerbate inequity by multiplying the educational advantages already
enjoyed by the rich, the educated, and the motivated. Moreover, opponents argue, such
market inequity is less acceptable in education than in other areas, because public schools
play a crucial social role in inculcating civic virtue and creating social mobility. See Henig,
supra note 57, at 20-25, 188-95. For a more critical summary of these arguments, see Paul
E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, in Learning from School Choice, supra note
64, at 23-28.
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to be too politically appealing to states. This is not to say that school dises-
tablishment is not accompanied by fierce political resistance in districts
subject to its sanction. Indeed, threatened local school district officials
and their supporters fight tooth and nail to retain their jobs and their
power.148 Disestablishment does not, however, engender statewide polit-
ical resistance in the way that financial remedies have, since the policy has
no direct impact on most of a state official's constituency. 149 States that
have struggled under mandates to spend new money or to redistribute
wealth-both of which states are loath to do-are likely to jump at a re-
medial regime that is not only revenue-neutral but also preserves the sta-
tus quo in most suburban school districts.150
Moreover, if districts are to be taken over, the states that will be given
an enormous amount of discretion over the affairs of failing schools are
the same states that have failed those schools so dramatically in the past.
Veterans of educational litigation against the states are not unreasonably
wary of a remedy that increases state power. 151 Indeed, they might see in
states' widespread adoption of disestablishment laws an effort by legisla-
148. See, e.g., Mahtesian, supra note 103, at 36 (reporting public marches and an
"endless stream of opprobrium" and systematic harassment directed at state officials).
Lawsuits, most of them unreported, have also been filed in several locations by local school
officials threatened with disestablishment. See, e.g., Contini v. Board of Educ., 668 A.2d
434, 446 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (lawsuit in Newark, New Jersey); Ex-Schools Chief
Denied Job, Educ. Wk., Dec. 10, 1997 (same in North Panola, Mississippi); Robert C.
Johnston, Justice Dept. Investigates Takeover of Calif. District, Educ. Wk., Mar. 26, 1997, at
18 (same in Compton, California); 2 Sue in Takeover of School District, Albany Times
Union, Jan. 24, 1996, at B2 (same in Roosevelt, New York); Priscilla Van Tassel, Schools
Reopen Amid Challenges, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1988, § 12, at 1 (same in Jersey City, New
Jersey); Paul Weaver, The Whifley County Story- A Study of State Intervention into a Poor,
Rural Appalachian Kentucky County School District 8 (1991) (unpublished Ed.D.
dissertation, University of Kentucky (Lexington)) (same in Whitley County, Kentucky).
149. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1', 710 A.2d 450, 480 (N.J. 1998) (reporting a
lower court conclusion that "it was 'almost impossible' to expect the Governor" to
recommend the school funding levels required by the court); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott R),
575 A.2d 359, 410 (N.J. 1990) (reporting, but rejecting, the request of plaintiffs in a school
finance case to "set forth the consequences of a legislative failure to act" on the grounds
that "the political problems created" by court-mandated school finance reform "are so
severe that unless the Legislature understands the cost of failure to conform, it may be
institutionally unable to take the steps required"); Kimberly J. McLarin, Trenton
Committee Snags on School Spending Plans, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1994, at B6 (reporting
deadlock on the New Jersey committee charged with developing a finance plan in the wake
of Abbott).
150. See Broden, supra note 118, at 784 (describing New Jersey's adoption of a
takeover law as part of a comprehensive education reform package as "[t]he result of the
[New Jersey Supreme Clourt's ruling" that funding inequities between the state's richest
and poorest school districts violated the state constitution); Jeff Archer, New Chapters
Written in Saga of Conn. Desegregation Case, Educ. Wk., June 11, 1997, at 17 (quoting
Connecticut Senator Thomas P. Gaffey as saying that the state takeover of the Hartford
schools was a response to the holding in the Sheffv. O'Neill desegregation case, 678 A.2d
1267 (Conn. 1996)).
151. Cf. Enrich, supra note 18, at 181-82 (expressing concerns that adequacy theories
of the right to an education give away too much in the fight for equality of educational
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tures and governors to appear responsive to their high courts' education
jurisprudence without providing new resources to poorly financed
schools. States might argue that they accept the judicially articulated
principle that they remain responsible for education in deficient districts,
but that they choose to meet that responsibility by disestablishment and
other management reforms rather than by providing such schools with
additional funds.
However, these political incentives cut both ways. The very political
benefits that make disestablishment politically attractive to states may
lead governors and legislators to pursue it seriously rather than to mount
rear-guard resistance. The political visibility of disestablishment is also
likely to lead to at least a good-faith effort to clean up districts once they
are disestablished. Such efforts sometimes produce results.' 52
More basically, disestablishment creates political accountability in
the same level of government that has legal accountability. When school
districts, generally ignored by all but a tiny fraction of the electorate, do
not stand between states and voters, voters are more able-and, it is to be
hoped, more willing-to hold states directly accountable for educational
failure. And this is as it should be: The judicial conclusion that states
may not hide behind the delegation of their responsibilities to school
districts' 53 ought to apply in politics as much as in courtrooms. A dises-
tablishment remedy forces states to face head-on, in the political arena,
their responsibility for the decisions they make about how best to provide
the educational services that their constitutions-and constituents-
require.
B. The Empirical Critique of Disestablishment
State takeovers over the past decade, and the more recent mayoral
takeovers, have generated not only theoretical arguments about the in-
centives they produce, but some empirical evidence as well. Early, lim-
ited studies of state takeovers suggested that, whatever its theoretical po-
tential, takeover was a failed policy in practice. However, more recent-if
somewhat less systematic-evidence suggests that this conclusion was at
best premature.
The only takeovers that have been the subjects of academic study-
the 1989 state takeovers ofJersey City, NewJersey and Floyd and Whitley
Counties in Kentucky 54-were characterized thus in 1992:
opportunity, but nevertheless advocating them as the best available way to improve
schooling).
152. See infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 115.
154. The Kentucky takeover laws, which authorized the Floyd and Whitley County
actions, were among the provisions declared unconstitutional by the wholesale rejection of
the Kentucky Education Code in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
215 (Ky. 1989); the takeovers were therefore aborted soon after they began. See supra
note 102. Rose makes no specific mention of the takeover provision.
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[T]akeover programs can have very little to do with long-term
educational improvement. The Kentucky and New Jersey pro-
grams have operated to promote goals other than improvement.
... In neither Kentucky [n] or New Jersey, was state agency
presence felt in the schools. No technical assistance seemed to
filter down. The states sent messages about their priorities that
were received by school personnel. Whether or not they in-
tended it, state policymakers indicated that their interest did not
really lie in school-level improvement.
In our opinion, if takeover fails to improve teaching and
learning, it is not worth the stigma suffered by school personnel
and communities. 155
This study also reports that state takeover officials "focus [ed] almost
entirely on administrative reorganization .... risking [their] credibility
by failing to focus on educational problems."1 5 6 Nor did the state reach
the more limited goals of improving state responsiveness to local circum-
stances or even of improving state oversight.157 Also, because takeover in
these states did not include the power to dismiss the teaching staff and
other local personnel, 158 these employees engaged in a "politics of wait-
ing" that reflected the conviction that they would outlast the state inter-
lopers, and that had the effect of undermining state initiatives. 159 At the
same time, the management reforms of the state appeared to have no
direct relationship to the practice of teaching or the academic perform-
ance of students. One can almost hear the critics of bureaucracy asking,
what did you expectd
Nevertheless, there are reasons to distrust the empirical evidence
against takeover. Its force is undermined by the fact that all of the avail-
able academic studies of takeover were conducted early in the takeover
process. The studies therefore overemphasize short-term implementa-
tion problems and may miss longer-term effects. As Dr. Beverly Hall, the
first state-appointed superintendent of schools in Newark, N.J., noted,
"Increases in test scores are expected and should be expected.... What is
unrealistic is the time frame that the public and others have for accom-
plishing it."160
The early academic studies have not been followed by longer-term
scholarly analyses. However, journalists' and insiders' descriptions of
155. Fuhrman & Elmore, supra note 135, at 27-28.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 30, 32.
158. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Compare "reconstitution," a policy
in which all school-level personnel in an underperforming school are replaced while
district-level officials remain in place. See Luis Ricardo Fraga et al., Consensus Building
and School Reform: The Role of the Courts in San Francisco, in Changing Urban
Education, supra note 64, at 66, 73, 76-79; Kelly C. Rozmus, Education Reform and
Education Quality. Is Reconstitution the Answer?, 1998 BYU Educ. & L.J. 103, 103-104.
159. Rettig, supra note 101, at 241; see id. at 241-44.
160. Mahtesian, supra note 103, at 38.
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takeovers past their earliest years tend, if somewhat sketchily, to report
management improvements in taken-over schools, suggesting that the pol-
icy's organizational costs are concentrated in the first years of implemen-
tation. 16 1 At the same time, while early studies argued that there was no
clear link between reform of school-district management and the practice
of teaching or the success of learning, later accounts tend to report cases
where taken-over districts begin to show improvement in educational per-
formance after several years. 162 It is of course difficult to assess these
claims, which have yet to be confirmed by systematic study; still, the weak-
nesses of the early studies are apparent.
In addition, no empirical work has assessed whether district officials
change their behavior if they face the real possibility of losing their jobs
when their students fail to learn. While deterrence is difficult to study,
ignoring it completely is the outstanding limitation of the empirical stud-
ies of takeover. If in fact the successes of disestablishment statutes are to
be found in districts that reform themselves to avoid state sanctions, 163
the exclusive focus of the empirical literature on early takeover imple-
mentation is positively contrarian.'6
161. Compare Tewel, supra note 92, at 228 (reporting "demoralization," "cynicism,"
and the "equivalent of war" in the monitoring process leading up to the Jersey City
takeover, leading to the "brutalization of the education provided for the children ofJersey
City"), and Lynn Olson, Veterans of State Takeover Battles Tell a Cautionary Tale, Educ.
Wk., Feb. 12, 1997, at 25 (quoting state-appointed superintendent in Cleveland's
complaint that "it is almost impossible for us to move quickly"), with DavidJ. Hoff, W.Va.
Leaves District Better Than It Found It, Educ. Wk., Sept. 18, 1996, at 17 ("West Virginia has
relinquished the reins of a struggling school system [in Logan County), leaving behind a
rare state-takeover success story a state-hired superintendent in charge of a system with
higher test scores and better management and buoyed by local acceptance."), and
Mahtesian, supra note 103, at 38 (reporting findings of an independent evaluation,
conducted four years into the Jersey City takeover, of "impressive" and "substantial"
managerial and fiscal improvement).
162. Compare Berman, supra note 104, at 70 ("It is unclear just what linkage state
school-administrators in New Jersey and elsewhere have seen between improved school
management and student achievement."), with Dan Weissmann, State Takeovers Painful
But Productive, Catalyst, Mar. 1993, at 7, 7 ("[Takeover] was a hell of an embarrassment to
the kids as well as the community,... [b]ut... it gets results.") (discussing state takeovers
in South Carolina), and Andy Newman, Jersey City Schools Improve, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
1996, at BI (New Jersey ed.) (state officials reporting "marked improvement" on
standardized tests seven years into the Jersey City takeover).
163. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
164. Fuhrman & Elmore, see supra note 135, do seem to understand takeover as a
policy that is designed to change intergoverumental incentives, since they consider
academic bankruptcy policy in a study whose subtitle is "Working Models of New State and
Local Regulatory Relationships." Nevertheless, they focus their attention exclusively on
relationships that follow in the wake of takeover, ignoring those that precede takeover as
well as those in districts that ultimately are not taken over.
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IV. DisEsTABLIsHmENT, LOCAL CONTROL, AND MINORrrTY
POLITCAL PARTICIPATION
Professor Richard Elmore calls state takeover a policy that "effectively
overrid[es] local governance structures in the interest of state policy
objectives."' 65 Professor Paul Berman sees in it the possibility of "disdain
for local officials."1 66 It is clear that disestablishment statutes, even as
they leave most school districts untouched, shift power from local author-
ities to states. Disestablishment therefore troubles those who value local
control over education independently of its utility as a technique of edu-
cational management. This Part argues that such concerns should not
deter courts from imposing disestablishment remedies.
Although local school governments are generally not mandated by
the texts of state constitutions, 167 local control remains an important
norm in American education. The United States Supreme Court has in-
sisted that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy
has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to [the] quality of the educa-
tional process." 168 Several states have joined the Court in treating local
control as a quasi-constitutional norm, even though their state constitu-
tions make only ambiguous references to-or, in some cases, no mention
at all of-local school governance. 169 Some state courts have also upheld
funding disparities between poor and rich school districts by finding a
state's interest in local control to be a rational basis for treating districts
unequally.' 7 0
Local control over schooling serves a range of values. Milliken itself
claims that local control enhances "community concern" for, and the
"quality" of, education. 171 Professor Briffault adds that local control can
serve the values of parental control over children, administrative and eco-
nomic efficiency, accountability, and democratic participation. 72 Echo-
ing several of these points, Professor Elmore also argues that locally-based
165. Richard F. Elmore, The Role of Local School Districts in Instructional
Improvement, in Designing Coherent Education Policy- Improving the System, supra note
80, at 96, 99.
166. Berman, supra note 104, at 70.
167. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
168. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
169. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982);
Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 821-22 (Ohio 1979); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d
139, 147 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.V.2d 568, 582 (Wis. 1989). These cases are collected and discussed in Briffault, supra
note 78, at 782-83 & nn.40-42.
170. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1022-23; Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672
N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (I1. 1996); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135,
1150 (Okla. 1987); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 61 (I. 1995).
171. 418 U.S. at 741-42.
172. See Briffault, supra note 78, at 785-98.
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school districts may help to counterbalance the redistributive tendencies
of state politics by focusing on allocative, service-based concerns; they
may also permit readier adaptation of federal and state policies to local
circumstances. 173 Judge Weinstein suggests as well that local school dis-
tricts may "avoid[ ] the growth of bureaucracy that deadens local initia-
tive" and provide more responsive government.17 4 Finally, urban school
districts provide an environment that nurtures non-white political
power.175
Many of the values on this impressive list, however, lose their force
when applied to district disestablishment, for the simple reason that dises-
tablishment preserves local control except in a relatively narrow category
of jurisdictions: those where local control is failing. Deficient local
school districts are inefficient, surely in the administrative sense and al-
most as certainly in the economic one. They allocate resources poorly.
They presumably express federal and state educational policy badly if at
all. They are, by definition, of low quality. On the other hand, local
school districts that are adequate remain unaffected by a disestablishment
statute or associatedjudicial remedy. Moreover, because the vast majority
of school systems fall into the latter category, efficiencies that arise from
the system of local school districts, such as interdistrict competition
among public school systems, are essentially unaffected by
disestablishment. 176
One set of issues, however, remains: Even in inadequate school dis-
tricts, local control offers citizens opportunities for political participation,
catalyzes the growth of community-based political coalitions, and nur-
tures the careers of local political leaders. Moreover, since educational
deficiency is concentrated in school districts that serve racially and eco-
nomically heterogeneous populations,177 where opportunities for polit-
ical voice have historically been limited, 7 8 disestablishment is likely to
reduce such opportunities particularly in minority communities, where
voice is critical, while leaving most majority-dominated school districts
firmly subject to local preferences. 179 The racial implications of "white-
173. See Elmore, supra note 165, at 106-09.
174. Jack B. Weinstein, Equality, Liberty, and the Public Schools, 48 U. Cin. L. Rev.
203, 231 (1979).
175. See Rich, supra note 136, at 9-17.
176. For a description of public school competition, and a too-enthusiastic
endorsement of its virtues, see William A. Fischel, HowJudges are Making Public Schools
Worse, CityJ., Summer 1998, at 30, 40.
177. See Henig et al., supra note 2, at 11.
178. See Rufus P. Browning et al., Can Blacks and Latinos Achieve Power in City
Government? The Setting and the Issues, in Racial Politics in American Cities 3, 5 (Rufus
P. Browning et al. eds., 1990) (documenting growth in the number of blacks and Latinos
holding major public offices, but noting that this does not mean that "blacks and Latinos
[have] achieve[d] meaningful participation in city government").
179. While no statistically rigorous study has been conducted, a survey of 21 school
districts subjected to state or mayoral takeovers by legislative or administrative authorities
found that "all but three have predominantly minority enrollments, and most are at least
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dominated legislatures" determining the fate of minority school districts
are hard to ignore.180 Ignoring race becomes impossible when legisla-
tures and governors dependent on majority-white constituencies fire lo-
cally elected officials and appoint their own chosen boards and superin-
tendents in their places.181 In short, disestablishment does seem to have
discriminatory racial impact' 82 and to constrain the political incorpora-
tion of minorities, particularly of African Americans.' 8 3
It is unsurprising, therefore, that many inner city communities char-
acterize disestablishment as colonialist, racist, and worse.' 8 4 Courts con-
templating invoking a disestablishment statute could not help but worry
about opening themselves up to such accusations, nor could they but
wonder whether such accusations contain a germ of truth. Ultimately,
however, the charges against disestablishment are too glib. Disestablish-
ment does not pose a binary choice between political voice and adequate
80 percent nonwhite. Of eight districts that have been threatened with takeovers, all but
two have populations that are predominantly minority, and three are at least 93 percent
nonwhite." Beth Reinhard, Racial Issues Cloud State Takeovers, Educ. Wk., Jan. 14, 1998,
at 1.
180. Henig et al, supra note 2, at 267 (racial implications are "widely understood by
those involved").
181. See id. at 267-68.
182. A government policy's disparate racial impact does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment unless it can be shown to have been developed or applied with explicit racial
animus; therefore, even if statistically significant evidence of disparate racial impact were
found, disestablishment policy would not violate federal equal protection guarantees. See
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). It has been argued, however, that
disestablishment violates the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994), since it
differentially deprives residents of particular minority communities of a right to vote for
school officials that residents of other communities retain. The Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department ofJustice suggested in 1997 that there
might exist circumstances in which covered jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act
would have to secure Justice Department approval for takeover, see Texas v. United States,
523 U.S. 296, 299 (1998), but the United States Supreme Court declined to make such a
ruling, instead holding the question unripe, see id. at 302. Since that time, a federal
district court has held that the disestablishment of an elected school district with a transfer
of power to mayoral appointees does not violate the Act because "the Voting Rights Act
does not apply to appointed officials." Spivey v. Ohio, 999 F. Supp. 987, 997 (N.D. Ohio
1998). The United States Department of Justice has also investigated whether the state
takeover in Compton, California, violated the Voting Rights Act. See Laura Mecoy, State-
Run Schools Get Mixed Marks, Sacramento Bee,June 15, 1997, at Al. A full analysis of the
voting rights issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
183. See Rich, supra note 136, at 9 ("Recentralizaton and state receivership are real
threats to [African Americans'] newly acquired political power over schools.").
184. See, e.g., Henig et al., supra note 2, at 270 (quoting an African American
opponent of state participation in Baltimore school reorganization as saying, "You want to
know how [the state's involvement] comes across? It comes across as racist. The
undercurrent I see is, 'These black people can't learn, so why spend money on them?'");
Joseph Berger, Mixed Reviews for School Takeover Plan, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1995, at B4
(quoting charges by residents of Roosevelt, Long Island, that state takeover was "an insult
to Roosevelt's predominantly black community").
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education; rather, it offers educational improvement at some cost in
political autonomy.
Courts, like legislatures, cannot and should not try to deny that
tradeoff. To transfer authority for an urban, majority-black school district
from local to state officials is to shift power over the lives of blacks from
blacks to whites. A taken-over school district is an institution of local
political life no longer available to a community and its political leaders.
The likelihood that takeover will disproportionately be applied in non-
white districts constitutes an additional setback to minority political incor-
poration and to the perception of equity in the political system.
In the few but visible cities where disestablishment statutes require
the transfer of power from local school officials to city mayors rather than
to state officials, the relationship between incorporation and disestablish-
ment is more subtle butjust as real.' 85 Even though leadership of schools
remains at the local level, there are several reasons to think that disestab-
lishment will nonetheless undermine minority political power. Mayoral
disestablishment reduces the autonomy of the schools' 8 6 and destabilizes
their administration, x8 7 in an environment where minority influence over
the schools may already be tenuous. Moreover, such destabilization is
biased towards central authority: In large cities where elected school gov-
ernments have been the norm, to shift to mayoral authority is to concen-
trate power. Such concentration not only reduces the number of oppor-
tunities for minority politicians to build coalitions and support, but, by
moving education from the arena of the special election to that of the
general, it reduces the political reach of a school-centered power base.' 8 8
Finally, as the number of independent minority politicians shrinks, con-
cerns may grow about their allegiances. Mayors, who gain power when
state officials award them control of the schools, may feel beholden to
their benefactors in the statehouse. And any straightforward political
quid pro quo is likely to be less problematic than the general tendency of
urban mayoralties to serve downtown business interests, often to the ex-
185. Court involvement in ordering mayoral-based disestablishment is particularly
unlikely. State legislation that authorizes the transfer of authority to mayors, though
typically written as general legislation, nevertheless tends to apply only to one or a handful
of large cities. See supra notes 92-94. Since such legislation is generally applied to the
cities it targets without judicial intervention, see supra note 106, it is a limited tool for
courts. Thus, the general association of disestablishment with state takeover will intensify
when disestablishment is court-ordered.
186. See Michael N. Danielson & Jennifer Hochschild, Changing Urban Education:
Lessons, Cautions, Prospects, in Changing Urban Education, supra note 64, at 277, 278.
187. See Henig et al., supra note 2, at 270 ("Shifting the decision-making venue
sometimes destabilizes local-level coalitions.").
188. See, e.g., Marion Orr, The Challenge of School Reform in Baltimore: Race,Jobs
and Politics, in Changing Urban Education, supra note 64, at 93, 98, 101 (documenting
years of conflict between a white mayor and black school leadership in Baltimore and
noting the mayor's relative lack of interest in educational issues).
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clusion of other constituencies' demands for social services. 18 9 It is thus
unsurprising that community hostility to mayoral takeovers can be just as
strong as resistance to direct state management. 190
But while there are real trade-offs between disestablishment and in-
corporation, neither the amount nor the quality of the political incorpo-
ration that independent local school governments offer minority commu-
nities should be exaggerated. Independent school boards, for example,
are almost invisible players in the educational politics of big cities.191
Where education is an issue in city politics, it is unlikely to play out at the
school board level.' 9
2
More basically, the quality of political participation and voice offered
by school districts is quite poor. The very pathologies of local control are
what motivate the relocation of educational authority to the state level. 193
Mayors may be fairly accused of being overly responsive to business inter-
ests, but school boards have long been just as thoroughly captured by
elites.' 9 4 Boards in inadequate urban school districts may be particularly
prone to capture. Professor Rich reports that school boards in the several
urban school districts he studied were "cartel-like" organizations, 9 5 "co-
opt[ed]" by the white educational establishment, 9 6 and selected in elec-
tions "biased toward incumbents, union-backed candidates, and middle-
class professionals."'19 7 Rich concludes that "the local district system, as it
is now constituted, promotes racial and class apartheid" that can be ame-
liorated by state takeover.' 98 While not all scholars go as far as Rich,
189. See, e.g., Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic 30-34
(1987) ("There is a strong tendency for public officials and local businessmen, particularly
those with fixed assets, to regard each other with fond interest."); Richard Briffault, Our
Localism (pt. 2), 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 409 (1990) ("Although the rise to power of black
and Hispanic mayors in most of the nation's largest cities ... has increased the role of
minority and neighborhood interests in urban government, the imperatives of protecting
the local tax base and maintaining access to capital markets continue to structure urban
politics.").
190. See, e.g., Brian Harmon, Protestors Rally Against Takeover, Detroit News, Feb.
17, 1999, at A3 (quoting African American opponents of Detroit's mayoral takeover as
accusing state government of "wearing a white sheet"); Reinhard, supra note 179, at 18
(quoting Rev. Michael DeBose, Cleveland school board candidate, as saying "When you've
got black people in charge and a majority-black district, people think they don't know what
they're doing.... It's really insulting.").
191. See Danielson & Hochschild, supra note 186, at 278. This does not imply, of
course, that school boards do not affect schools in important ways that are off of the
political radar screen.
192. See Henig et al., supra note 2, at 50 ("Rather than occupying a separate political
sphere, school politics in Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit and D.C. became intertwined with city
politics writ large.").
193. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
194. See David B. Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban
Education 139 (1974).
195. Rich, supra note 136, at 5.
196. Id. at 208.
197. Id. at 207.
198. Id. at 211.
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many observers have noted school boards' focus on the employment and
career needs of administrators and employees to the frequent detriment
of the educational needs of broader constituencies. 19 9
In short, disestablishment creates a trade-off but not a bad deal. Aca-
demically bankrupt school districts are far from ideal political institu-
tions, and are clearly intolerable as educational institutions. Local con-
trol may be a quasi-constitutional value, but adequate education is in
many states a black-letter constitutional right, and in all states a more
important value than local control-especially since it is only the school
district, and not general local government, that is losing power. Courts
should therefore be willing, in the service of the right to decent educa-
tion, to enforce the trade-off that the legislature has authorized.
As Professor Browning and his colleagues note, minority political in-
corporation involves not only the election of minority officials but the
responsiveness of government to minority concerns.20 0 When minority-
dominated school boards and superintendents privilege power and pa-
tronage while falling spectacularly short of providing minimal educa-
tional opportunity to black and other minority students, minority control
cannot be characterized as incorporation. Indeed, when autonomy col-
lapses, state paternalism may be more responsive than local control to the
needs of minority communities. In any event, in a contest between local
politicians and local students, state courts, along with state legislatures,
are duty-bound to choose the children. They should not hesitate.
CONCLUSION
Courts, no matter what they do, are likely to continue to find them-
selves bit players in school reform. They cannot avoid this reality by pre-
tending that their limits are not real. Thus, school district disestablish-
ment is not a panacea. Indeed, perhaps its chief virtue as a judicial
remedy is that it does not purport to be one. But no remedy will ever be
fully adequate to solve a problem that rests so centrally in the hands of
actors as autonomous and varied as teachers, local administrators, and
parents. Courts can best help by inducing such people to make good
decisions for the children in their charge. Disestablishment offers a way
to restructure educational incentives so that people with the power to do
so will improve the lot of children who today are being cheated by their
schools, their school districts, and their states. Any partial progress to-
wards that end-especially in states that have been reluctant to take
larger steps-should be enthusiastically welcomed.
199. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 137, at 9 (describing typical urban school governance
as guided by an "employment regime" rather than a "performance regime").
200. See Rufus Browning et al., Minority Mobilization in Ten Cities, in Racial Politics
in American Cities, supra note 178, at 8, 9.
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